32 
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OE 
themselves with an undue proportion of artillery, which choked up the 
roads and hampered their movements. The rapid and incisive strategy 
of Napoleon necessitated, as a matter of course, a reduction in the 
number of guns which were brought into the field. Napoleon himself, 
as is well known, advocated 3 guns per 1000 as the minimum normal 
rate ;* but, as a matter of fact, he rarely brought more than 2\ or 
2 guns per 1000 men into the field, and sometimes even less. In 1805 
the “ Grande Armee” which marched on Ulm consisted, in the first 
instance (according to Thiers and De FezOnsac), of 186,000 men and 
340 guns (1*8 per 1000). The army which invaded Russia in 1812 
consisted of 608,000 men and 1242 guns (2 guns per 1000). 
Most European nations followed the example set by the French, and 
reduced the proportion of guns to men. Thus at Jena the Prussian army 
numbered 117,000 men and 280 guns (2*4 per 1000). Exceptional 
cases, however, occurred, in which a very large force of artillery was 
employed. In 1814, for instance, the allied army consisted of 405,300 
men and as many as 1414 guns (3*5 per 1000). The Russians, also, 
continued to trust strongly in artillery; in 1812 the three armies which 
opposed the French invasion numbered collectively 195,000 men and 
938 guns (4*8 per 1000). The French themselves, when they em¬ 
ployed small bodies independently, exceeded the rate of 3 per 1000 
considerably; for instance, at the battle of Brienne (1814), Ney^s corps 
consisted of 35,000 men and 128 guns (3’7 per 1000), and at the battle 
which took place before Paris in the same year, MarmonPs corps 
numbered 35,000 men and 154 guns (4*4 per 1000). 
During the long period of peace which ensued after the battle of 
Waterloo, the most suitable proportion which guns should bear to men 
afforded a subject for frequent discussion; in the main, however, 3 guns 
per 1000 men continued to be regarded, as the recognised normal rate, 
although some advocated the adoption of 3 guns per 1000 infantry and 
4 guns per 1000 cavalry. A somewhat remarkable exception was 
afforded by the German Confederation, which in 1830 adopted 2 guns 
per 1000 as the standard proportion of artillery to the other arms. On 
the other hand, the Russians in the Crimea and the Austrians in 1859 
brought a force of artillery into the field considerably in excess of 
3 guns per 1000 men. On the whole it may be said that, as the size 
of armies increased, the proportion of guns brought into the field became 
relatively somewhat smaller. 
Within the last few years, the introduction of rifled cannon and the 
enormous proportions which the armies of the continent have assumed^ 
have introduced fresh elements into the discussion of the subject, 
which, according to the writer in the “Archives,” have rendered it 
almost impossible to lay down a fixed rule which shall apply in all 
cases. An army of from 200,000 to 220,000 men will rarely advance 
by more than three, or at most four, parallel roads. Even supposing, 
* Although this is generally regarded as a maxim of Napoleon, it must be borne in mind 
that he was by no means constant in his opinion on this subject. In the “ Commentaires ” 
(Vol. VI. p. 167), he says:—“II faut avoir autant d’artillerie que son ennemi, et calculer sur 
4 pieces par 1000 hommes d’infanterie et de cavalerie.” 
