26 
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OF 
If the troops are not immediately wanted and the march by no means 
hurried, then the 36,000 men would arrive sooner by a double railroad 
than by marching, when the distance does not exceed 21 miles (98 miles 
English), and the times by marching and by a single line of rails would be 
about equal. 
Erom these calculations one short law can be deduced for the movement 
of great masses of troops: that by double lines troops can only be brought 
into battle by the railroad witli advantage when the number of German miles 
is more than half the number of thousands of the troops (English miles 
2J times the number of thousands), and by single lines only when it is three- 
fourtlis of that number (English miles 3^ times the number of thousands, 
nearly); and for ordinary purposes by a double line, when the number of 
miles is x 7 2 -ths of the number of thousands of the troops (English miles 2| 
times the number of thousands), and by a single line when it is more than 
the number of the troops (English miles 4£ times the number of thousands). 
Eor instance, 60,000 men which are wanted for battle will arrive at the same 
time from a distance of 30 miles (140 miles English) whether they go by rail or 
march; under 30 miles they will arrive sooner marching, over 30 sooner by 
rail. Where the line is single they will march 45 miles (210 miles English) 
in the same time as they would take by rail, under 45 miles they will arrive 
sooner marching, over 45 miles sooner by rail. Thus it all depends upon 
the length of the march. But even for short distances, the transport of 
troops by the rail saves time for the infantry. Upon a double line of rail¬ 
way, at least 10,000 men, upon a single line 7000 men, can be sent daily. 
Cavalry and artillery could then march; these can easily go from 4 to 5 
miles a day (say 19 to 23 miles English) for three or four days. By these 
means 50,000 may in four days be moved upon a point which is from 16 to 19 
miles (7 5 to 89 miles English) distant. This the French could have done several 
times. They would have done it to great advantage in the second fight round 
Orleans, during the battles in and round the woods of Marchenoir; but the 
idea never seems to have entered into General Chanzyhs head. 
But the general must not lose sight of the moral effect upon the troops 
when he decides to convey them by rail. It is unavoidably prejudicial to 
discipline; therefore young troops should not be sent by it. For them, every 
day on the railroad diminishes their usefulness, and every day on the march is 
often an invaluable day of practice in the art of war. So the conveyance of 
troops is only one side of the question of the use of railroads; far more 
important is the second—the conveyance of provisions, the reserve weapons, 
and articles of clothing. In this the railroad does such good service that 
by its means alone can war on the large scale of the present day be carried 
on. Armies have become so large that the land will not support them if 
they have to remain long in one place. The stores are of course larger after 
the harvest, and less immediately before it; on an average, however, it may 
be reckoned that there are enough provisions for the inhabitants for 30 days. 
Thus, if the country to be occupied is inhabited by 150,000 men, therefore 
from 30 to 35 square miles (from 700 to 800 square miles English) in 
extent, 4,500,000 rations, those for women and children included, may 
be reckoned upon. If 150,000 soldiers are added to the number of 
inhabitants who require daily double rations, that gives only provisions 
for 10 days, when all goes well. If the enemy is equal in numbers, 
