THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
23 
THE USE OE RAILROADS IN TIME OF WAR. 
COMMUNICATED BY 
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR DAVID WOOD, K.C.B. 
In the beginning of the war between Erance and Prussia, in 1869, rail¬ 
roads were so much used on both sides, that everybody who would rightly 
understand this and all following wars must make himself acquainted with 
the extent to which railroads can be used for warlike purposes. Some 
undertakings failed because the railroad was used, and the success of others 
was hindered because it was discovered, too late, that they could not be 
carried out without the railroad. Some delays were met with on the Prussian 
side which appeared incomprehensible, because a railroad which was thought 
to be available was not so; and, again, others were caused by neglecting to 
use a railroad which was really available. Sometimes too much, sometimes 
too little has been expected of them; and their importance has been at times 
as much over as under-rated by both nations. 
A railroad will convey a certain amount of weight, with sufficient 
rolling stock, in a certain direction, in a certain time, for a certain distance. 
1. The railroad is only of use in certain directions. In this it differs from 
every other mode of progress. When troops march, they can, if necessary, 
change their direction at any moment; but by the railway they must follow 
the direction of its lines, and only where these cross each other can they take 
another; therefore, if the enemy knows that troops are advancing by rail, 
he can easily guess the points from which the attack may be expected. 
Besides, it follows from this limited power of direction, that the troops being 
transported by rail must be covered by other troops not on the railway; and as, 
for long distances, it is seldom that enough troops are available to cover all 
places which the railroad passes, and as a knowledge of the transport at 
any place—even thirty or more miles distant from the assembling point— 
is sufficient to disclose this point, so it happens that, against a watchful and 
enterprising enemy, it cannot be expected that an undertaking which is based 
upon the use of the railroad can remain concealed, except when it is directed 
straight upon the enemy's front, and is covered by advanced troops. These 
are the operations which in war lead to definitive results—in which, 
however* each division, by a simple retreat upon its supports, can call for a 
fresh decision. Those attacks upon the enemy's flanks which are fatal to 
