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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF 
and third line should advance to distances of 50 yds. to sustain the first 
line at the crisis. 
One line should never relieve another line in battle, nor should skir¬ 
mishers ever be brought back; but what is in rear should be advanced 
to reinforce what is in front. 
V. 
The artillery fight thus :—The guns of the first line open fire upon 
the enemy when he comes within effective range—2000 yds. The guns 
of the second line reinforce the guns of the first line, to fire upon the 
artillery of the enemy advanced on the flanks of his attack. Guns must 
not be advanced in the face of an infantry attack of the enemy so as 
to mask the infantry of the defence. 
The guns in first line must remain in action until the very last. 
NOTE ON LINE AND COLUMN OF INFANTRY. 
Line is always necessary in front, for the greater development of 
musketry fire; and line is the safer formation under artillery fire. 
Column is a safer formation under musketry fire for all troops not 
actually in front; and we must have columns to oppose columns, when 
the columns of the enemy, being screened, are not exposed to the con¬ 
centrated fire of our line. 
Our battalion columns collect too many men in one place. We object 
to form our second line into battalion columns for close battle, not 
because that formation would be more dangerous—for it would really 
be less dangerous—but because it is according to our old traditions to 
fight in line. If, however, it were ordered that the second line should 
form battalion columns when within 500 yds. of the enemy, the battalion 
columns would not in close battle properly support the battalions in 
line; the columns would actually support the line only at intervals too 
far between; and, moreover, the columns would be Wastefully strong. 
By regulation and tradition, we are to go into battle in two lines. 
We should certainly have to fight against some order of line and column 
combined. If we should to the last preserve any considerable distance 
between our lines, they might be beaten in detail; if we should at the 
last close our second line upon our first line, both might be overwhelmed 
in the same disaster. In either case there would be no reserve; the 
troops would get out of hand whole lines at a time. However, we 
should most likely win, because we always have won; but we should 
win only by the men breaking the order in which they were led into 
action, and falling instinctively into that order which is denied them by 
Regulation—that is to say, by the second line closing upon the first, and 
the men swarming at intervals along the line. 
