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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF 
proacli is discovered, moments are important to establish a fire before he can 
alter his dispositions to meet it. I do not in the least overlook the import¬ 
ance of securing the initiative of fire on every occasion, but I maintain that it 
is more possible to secure it by secrecy than by dash. In the case of a direct 
attack, it is only possible by secrecy. The enemy knows the range of all the 
positions that can be taken up by artillery, he is on the look out for every 
indication of their being occupied, and as soon as artillery is seen coming 
wildly over the crest, he pours in a storm of shell which probably puts 
several guns hors de combat before they even unlimber. 
This importance of the initiative of fire was well understood by Napoleon, 
and was one of the causes of his great success with artillery. I think it was 
at Austerlitz that the French artillery under Senarmont, although inferior in 
number of guns, prevented the Austrians, who came up by degrees, from ever 
getting their guns into action. So, in a pamphlet by Captain Laymann, of 
the Prussian infantry, there is evidence to show that the initiative of fire 
established by the Austrian artillery was one of the main causes of the com¬ 
parative failure of the Prussian artillery in the campaign of 1866. 
It is sometimes possible, however, to take up a position so quietly, by 
running the guns up by hand (where the ground is not very steep)—at all 
events by exposing the smallest possible number of horses, that the guns may 
be able to open fire before they are discovered. 
Prom what I have said of the true mobility of artillery, the proper place 
and use of horse and field artillery follows. As at present organised, our 
field batteries are not capable of moving out of a walk with any degree of 
efficiency, except for very short distances. The gunners must be left to toil 
behind, as-but three, or at the most four, men can be taken with the gun. 
Witness the well-known case of Turner’s two guns at the Alma, which arrived 
in position on the flank of the Bussians without gunners, and were served by 
a brilliant staff of artillery officers who were on the spot; and fortunately had 
nothing else to do. By the introduction of axle-tree seats, we are on the eve 
of increasing the mobility of the field batteries, which may possibly be still 
further increased by mounting men on the off horses of the gun teams. 
I hope to see the mobility of field batteries increased to the utmost extent 
possible. I believe it to be the direction in which the greatest practical 
reform is now to be made, and it will double the power of the artillery that 
first takes it in hand. Some people have supposed that upon this level 
might be created a field artillery in substitution of both our present horse 
artillery and field batteries. This by no means follows. A very slight con¬ 
sideration of the respective uses of horse artillery and field batteries, will 
show that they stand upon different ground, and that the necessity for both 
is unassailable. Horse artillery is required to act with cavalry, supported 
by and supporting it; to accompany it in long and rapid reconnaissances, 
to execute long flanking movements extending over many miles of ground, 
and generally to act with freedom and rapidity on the wings, and in pursuit, 
and in retreat. Field batteries are, or should be, equally mobile on a 
confined area, and mounted detachments would be superfluous, and even 
mischievous, for all the ordinary purposes of the line of battle, and working 
generally with infantry. Fewer horses are exposed to fire, and the cost 
of raising and maintaining, and difficulty of fqraging is greatly diminished. 
For these reasons the bulk of the artillery must always be field bat- 
