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room, and did nothing. In the French war, the guns were much more on the 
flanks; notably at Sedan, where the batteries on the flank and rear of the 
French above Floing were a marked feature of the battle. 
Guns may often be pushed forward on the flanks so as to overlap the 
enemy on both flanks, and squeeze him out of a position. If there is any 
ground for artillery on the flanks within range—that is to say, a mile, or a 
mile and a half on either flank—this is perfectly safe. If the guns can find a 
position to annoy the enemy seriously, he must either penetrate between them 
and the main body to cut them off, make a direct attack on them, or again 
outflank them. He cannot attempt to cut them off without getting squeezed 
between them and the guns with the main body. If he makes a direct attack, 
or flank attack on the outer flank, his whole position of defence is shaken, 
to say nothing of the loss of time in making his dispositions for attack. 
The position at Frensham, between the Great and Little Ponds, facing east, 
is an example of what I mean. An attacking force at Kettlebury Hill could 
outflank it, both right and left, concentrating an artillery fire on the rear of the 
position from Lock's Hill and the ground above on one flank, and the hillocks 
beyond the Devil's Jumps and towards Greyshot Down on the other. All 
the forces support each other with artillery fire. The Frensham force can¬ 
not move across the common without the risk of being crushed between all 
three, or attack either flank without in turn exposing itself. The radical 
fault of the position is, that whether occupied compactly or with some exten¬ 
sion, its flanks and rear are insecure against an active artillery, without an 
immense extension, whilst the openness of Frensham Common in its front, 
which is an obstacle to direct attack, is also an obstacle to counter attack. 
The full development of the power of rifled artillery will, I believe, only be 
attained by still bolder movements on the flank and rear of an enemy, sending 
guns with strong escorts to make long detours to seize positions from 
which the whole position of the enemy may be shaken. There is always such 
ground to be found by a tactical genius, and even where the real effect of the 
fire may be comparatively trifling, the moral effect created by the sudden and 
unexpected appearance of a force of doubtful strength in a dangerous neighbour¬ 
hood will go far to loosen the hold of the enemy on his main position. These 
extended flank attacks of artillery will of course be combined with the deter¬ 
mined attack of the main position. They are no doubt to some extent 
dangerous—the force may be thrown upon an eccentric line of retreat, cut off 
from the main body, sometimes sacrificed altogether; but the possible results 
are so brilliant that a general who thoroughly understands the power of rifled 
guns will not hesitate to develop his tactics in this direction. Horse artillery 
find one of their main uses in these extended movements, but to gain the full 
advantage of the freedom of artillery, we must, I think, alter our system of 
escorts. The escort of a battery now is ludicrously insufficient. A troop—at 
the most a squadron—is sent with a battery of horse artillery. What use is it ? 
Any attack made on the battery by cavalry would be made most certainly in 
superior force, and against a few infantry skirmishers the battery is 
powerless. The escorts of detached batteries should always, when possible, be 
composed of both infantry and cavalry, and should be of sufficient strength to 
hold the front and flanks of the battery against sudden attack. The escort is 
the eye of the battery, and should, by its skirmishers, search and overlook all 
the ground on the front and towards the flanks, particularly the most exposed 
