THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
153 
one, so that the commanding officer of the battery will be relieved of all fear 
of sudden and imperceived attack, and free to devote liimself entirely to the 
effect of his own fire. It is impossible to lay down absolute rules for tbe 
strength of escorts; they must depend on the service for which the artillery is 
required, and the degree to which it is separated from the main body. 
Probably, when separated at all, the escort ought seldom to be less than half 
a battalion of infantry and two squadrons of cavalry. What can be more 
absurd than when a battery has got into a good place, and established a fire 
on the flank of the enemy, to see it obliged to retire before the fire of a dozen 
skirmishers ? 
I know that the subject of escorts is rather an unpopular one. Com¬ 
manding officers and brigadiers dislike their regiments and brigades being 
weakened; the officers who command the escort consider it a disagreeable and 
inglorious duty. Opinions differ as to the formation of the escort. The 
author of the “ Tactical Eetrospect ” is strongly in favour of a special and 
permanent escort, but a recent pamphlet which many in this room may 
have read, by the Prince of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, the Commandant of the 
Brigade of Artillery of the Prussian Guard, is as strongly against it. I 
believe that although there are many advantages in accustoming the same 
bodies of troops to work together, the practical difficulties in the way of a 
permanent escort would be very great, and that it would be better to form it 
on the spot for the particular service required. I have spoken of the force as 
an escort, and this, perhaps, rather conveys the idea of a small force, entirely 
subordinate to the battery; but it is obvious that it might often be of very 
considerable strength, and that the officer commanding might or might not 
be the artillery commanding officer. The reason I speak of it as an escort is 
that I suppose the artillery attack to be the main object, the other troops 
being only for the protection of the artillery, though of course the dispositions 
for defence would rest with the senior officer. I feel sure as the subject is 
considered and discussed, whatever there may now be of prejudice will give 
way, and it will be seen that the whole benefit of the invention of rifled guns 
depends on their latitude of movement, that there cannot be this without 
security from attack and capture, within reasonable limits, and that the part 
of both guns and escort in the critical flank movements of which I have been 
speaking is of the highest importance, and one that offers the highest opportuni¬ 
ties of distinction to both. It is of course impossible that in very rapid and 
extended operations an infantry escort can accompany horse artillery. I only 
say whenever it is possible the three arms should be together, and infantry 
should always follow if there is a hope of their being able to get up. 
The advance of the artillery on a position after it has been stormed, is 
rendered more difficult by the increased range of guns. When guns used to 
fire at 700 or 800 yds., it was easy to see when to limber-up and advance. Now 
that the guns are probably firing at two or three times that range, they may, 
after supporting the attack from their first position, either not see the right 
moment to advance, or be delayed by the length and difficulty of the ground 
they have to traverse, so that the infantry, after their first success, may find 
themselves again in face of the enemy, exposed at perhaps short range to 
artillery fire, without the support of their own artillery. Here is one of the 
most difficult problems for the commander of the artillery—to provide for 
the effective cannonade of the first position, to cover a check or repulse, and 
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