THE KOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
155 
First, although the Prussian artillery showed marked improvement since 
1866, and although a general impression exists that it was very perfect, 
I think most Prussian officers would say that there was still plenty of room 
for improvement in its tactical performances. Witness the able pamphlet 
“ Die Schaden der Organisation der Preussichen Artillerie." 
Next, something must be allowed for the natural tendency of artillery 
commanding officers to wish to keep large masses under their own hands. The 
mere fact of having brought a large number of guns into action has some¬ 
thing sensational about it; it strikes the imagination, and is sure to be re¬ 
membered. The recorded facts of artillery in the wars of Napoleon are 
chiefly concentrations of large numbers of guns, and it is even yet hard to pass 
from the letter of his tactics. 
I am far from saying that artillery should never be massed now, only that 
the occasions are much more rare, since guns can now work effectively over a 
far larger arc. 
The evils of concentration are these :—The guns obtain only a direct fire 
on their object. They hamper the other arms, are less protected by them, 
and cannot support their attack so long, as a general rule, as when dispersed. 
Unless the country is very open, and practicable for all arms, the guns must 
either arrive unsupported, or be late in coming up. Prince Hohenlohe advo¬ 
cates the reserve artillery of a corps d’armee marching at the head of the main 
body of infantry, on the special ground that a mass of artillery can be utilised 
in action before the infantry comes up, for half an hour or more; aud Captain 
Laymann takes much the same view. What if an attack upon this mass of 
guns should be pushed home by swarms of skirmishers ? I believe the very 
case might have occurred to the artillery of the Crown Prince's army at Sedan. 
It was pushed forward early in the morning across the Meuse, towards Floing, 
and was long unsupported. Blumenthal was very uneasy about it, and per¬ 
haps if Ducrot had remained in command of the French, and carried out the 
retreat he wished, the blot might have been hit. 
Lastly, masses of artillery, like cavalry, may be kept in hand for grand 
opportunities that never come. 
What, then, are the modifications in artillery tactics to be looked for in the 
immediate future ? 
Extension of front and depth, both in attack and defence. 
Dispersion of batteries, both for security, and more effective concentration 
of fire. 
Employment of horse artillery on the greater radius, field batteries on the 
less. 
Bolder action of guns on the flanks and rear in detached positions. 
Large escorts with detached batteries handled as a separate tactical force. 
Care to take advantage of shelter in moving. 
Large intervals between guns when moving, and between limbers also in 
action. 
The sacrifice of guns, if necessary, to secure the success of the main 
operation. 
These are some of the principles by which we must guide ourselves in the 
future application of artillery. In what I have already said, I have tried to 
bring them into relief. It remains for me now to touch upon the more promi¬ 
nent faults which we see committed in the handling of the arm, to consider 
