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how they can be avoided, and, finally, how the systematic tactical training 
can best be given, which is, I believe, the greatest want of our army at the 
present moment, not only in the handling of each arm to the best advantage, 
but in the higher and only real sense of tactics, the handling of the arms in 
combination. 
And here I wish to say that any criticisms I offer are made in no dogmatical 
spirit. They will count only for what they are worth, you can judge them 
without the bias of any personal weight, and can readily form your own con¬ 
clusions. The one thing I earnestly wish, is to excite interest and discussion 
on the subject. There can be no progress without discussion, but out of full 
and free discussion truth will finally prevail. I need hardly add that as I 
claim no personal authority, neither do I wish to claim any monopoly of 
tactical knowledge for artillery officers. To fail in technical artillery know¬ 
ledge would indeed be disgraceful to us, but in the school of tactics we are all 
learners together; we are fully sensible that the faults committed in the field 
are often our own, we wish to study together how to avoid these faults, and, 
hand in hand, to advance the knowledge and power of the noble service to 
which we all belong. 
Horse artillery is too much used with disregard of its special advantages. 
It is commonly sent a few hundred yards to the front to open fire at the com¬ 
mencement of an action. Thus it may be crippled early in the day for no 
corresponding advantage. A few moments are of no importance, and in every 
point of view field batteries are more effective in direct fire. It may, of course, 
be necessary to push horse artillery with cavalry some distance to the front, 
beyond the effective range of the guns with the main body. I only contend 
that horse artillery ought not to be used for direct fire when field batteries are 
available before the crisis of the action, nor ought it to be placed in position 
in the main line of defence without very cogent reason. 
A Trench troop of horse artillery was sacrificed in this way in the Crimean 
war at the Tchernaya. It defended the Traktir Bridge at short range, and in 
a position where a field battery might have found better cover and fought 
with better effect. 
In spite of the recent order of H.B.H. the Commander-in-Chief, artillery 
clings desperately to the other arms. The guns move more independently, 
but at the hottest time guns and infantry are pretty sure to be jammed up 
together. The field day I have already quoted is an instance—a brigade of 
infantry and several batteries jostling each other upon Long Hill. Surely 
the mass of artillery should have been upon the range behind, over the 
steeple-chase course, with some batteries of horse artillery on the slopes under 
Caesar's Camp. 
Again, in an attack on Caesar's Camp and Beacon Hill from the north, 
little can be done by artillery in the plain in support of the direct attack of 
infantry, but is there not some field on either flank for detaching artillery, or 
rather a strong mixed force ? The position is a very strong one against direct 
attack, but on the flanks and rear it is assailable, and is moreover an awk¬ 
ward one to retire from. 
Again, in the attack on Eox Hills by General Carey, was there not scope 
for a free use of artillery considerably on the right of General Tysons' brigade, 
so as to gain the height and sweep the position in flank as soon as the 
mask should be thrown off ? And for the cavalry and horse artillery of the 
