THE 310YAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
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defence, or at all events part of it, was it not an error to retire before the 
brigade directly across the narrow plateau, and towards the remainder of the 
force P I believe an eccentric retreat towards the left, the guns remaining on 
General Lysons' right, would have done much more to check his advance, and 
have given more time to Sir C. Staveley to take up a second position. There 
would have been no more risk in this, I think, but in any case safety was not 
the first consideration. The whole brunt of the defence was thrown upon the 
troops at that point, and they were bound to sacrifice themselves to gain time. 
Guns are generally too crowded, and positions taken up in a hurry. This, 
no doubt, arises from the anxiety to be doing something, and from the small 
space over which the guns are manoeuvred. It would soon be corrected if the 
batteries were accustomed to a freer handling. 
Guns should never be in the same line with infantry; mitrailleuses may 
probably find a place with them in the close attack of positions, but guns are 
hard to place effectively under infantry fire, and their fire is less effective at 
rifle ranges. Infantry would occupy the ground better. 
This ought to be well understood, for nothing is a more common error in 
our manoeuvres than the way in which skirmishers retiring retire at once to 
guns in action, instead of holding their ground in advance of the flanks. At 
the very moment guns are most useful in checking the enemy's advance, they 
are forced to retire because pressed by his skirmishers. And so it goes on; 
the guns retire, immediately the skirmishers retire again to them, and so on. 
The artillery is, I think, hampered by an honourable tradition which attaches 
disgrace to the loss of a gun. This has been carried much too far. There 
would be indeed disgrace in the loss of guns through carelessness, or want of 
proper precaution, but none in the sacrifice of guns for a worthy object. 
Daring in attack, and persistency in defence will seldom be carried to the full 
extent to which they are capable whilst this opinion holds its ground to the 
extent it does. 
Still more is this the case in manoeuvres. Everything tends to make an. 
officer inactive. Without excitement and hope of distinction to spur him on, 
he will be little inclined to lay himself open to blame for losing his guns, or to 
take it out of his horses by hard work. He sticks to old fashioned ways— 
to what is safe and sure. Rashness should be encouraged at field days, that 
we may learn what really may be safely undertaken and accomplished. 
The real safety of our guns should be confided to the other arms. Artillery 
is powerful only for offence, and the cavalry and infantry should feel that it is 
their part to defend the guns with which they have a brotherhood in arms, as 
it is the part of the guns to support them to the uttermost. The shame 
in the loss of guns should be to the brigades and regiments with which 
they are placed, the shame to the gunners in allowing the other troops to be 
overwhelmed. 
One fault that much prevents the success of our field days, is the little 
idea of the operations given to the officers holding subordinate commands. 
Eor instance, the officers commanding batteries are seldom told more than 
to take up a position on a certain hill, or to support a particular attack. 
They generally only know vaguely that the enemy is somewhere in their front. 
If he is imaginary, they seldom know what strength he is supposed to be, where 
he comes from, and on which point his retreat is likely to be, how far his 
position extends, on what point of the position the fire is to be directed, where 
