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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF 
The ordnance service is naturally and necessarily divided into two grand 
primary divisions—the artillery that follows an army into the field, and the 
artillery that does not; the artillery whose success depends not only on its 
fire but on its mobility, and the artillery whose success depends wholly and 
entirely on its fire; the artillery of motion, and the artillery of rest; field 
artillery and garrison artillery. Such a division is no matter of opinion or 
choice; it is a division made necessary by the nature of things. This 
division forms the first principle of artillery organisation, and any organisa¬ 
tion which neglects or contravenes it must be faulty and vicious. 1 2 This 
principle, self-evident as it now appears, was almost universally disregarded 
or overlooked at the beginning of the century; and it was generally agreed 
that the artillery service should be divided, not into field and garrison 
artillery, but into horse artillery and the rest of the artillery. As well 
divide the revolutions of the sun into evening and the rest of the twenty- 
four hours ! As well divide the habitable globe into valleys and the rest of 
the earth's surface! As well divide the human race into gunners and the 
rest of mankind ! 3 In Austria alone the primary principle of all artillery 
organisation was never lost sight of, and was always acted upon. There 
only the field batteries were always recognised as an integral and necessary 
part of the field artillery; elsewhere they were looked on and treated as an 
offshoot of the garrison artillery. They were called field batteries by 
courtesy, but they were in truth an incoherent mass of garrison gunners, 
field guns, and, in many cases, farm horses and ploughboys. 
Little wonder that while such clouds lowered over the field batteries, 
they were hidden, not in the shades of “ disastrous twilight/' 3 but in the 
“ gloom of infernal darkness !" 4 
In 1793, the gun carriages and ammunition carriages of the English 
army in Elanders were “ of very faulty construction, and the drivers were 
either hired men, or men borrowed from the infantry.The 
carriages were of single draft, and the drivers were in consequence on 
foot, having generally three horses to each driver.At this 
time, however, the British artillery had the mortification of seeing the English 
wagons which were furnished to the Hanoverian artillery drawn by four 
horses, and driven by two drivers mounted. During the campaign of 1793, 
1 “ Feld- imd Festungs-Artillerie als zwei getrennte Truppenkorper, jeder mit seinem eignen, 
seinem Wesen entsprechenden Officiercorps und mit eigener selbststandiger Organisation, formirt 
werden sollen.”—“Wie soli die Trennung der Feld- und Festungs-Artillerie bewirkt werden.” 
Leipsig, 1872, p. 21. 
“ Feld- und Festungs-Artillerie ... wenig mebr gemein haben, als die Theorie der Flug- 
babnen ibrer Geschosse.”—“Die Schaden der Organisation der Preussicben Artillerie.” Leipsig, 
1871, p. 6. See also “Die Erfolge der Preussiscben Feld-Artillerie in der Campagne 1870-71.” 
Leipsig, 1872, p. 10. 
2 Tbe three rules of a good logical division are:—1. Each of tbe parts, or any, short of all, 
must contain less ( i.e ., have a narrower signification) than the thing divided. 2. All the parts 
taken together must be exactly equal to the thing divided. 3. The parts, or members, must be 
opposed— i.e., must not be contained in one another. See Reid’s “ Account of Aristotle’s Logic,” 
Chap. 2, Sect. 2. A moment’s consideration will show that the division of the artillery service 
into horse artillery and the rest of the artillery, is a flagrant violation of the third rule. 
3 “ Paradise Lost.” 
4 I borrow this phrase from Eusebius, the ecclesiastical historian, quoted in Gibbon’s “ Decline 
and Fall of the Roman Empire,” Yol. III. p. 9. Murray’s Ed. 
