22 0 
MINUTES OP PROCEEDINGS OF 
artillery, and hated the field batteries. 1 Templehoff, justly considering the 
field batteries to be the most important, because the most formidable, branch 
of the field artillery service, unfortunately could discover no other way of 
raising them than by depressing the horse artillery; and with deplorable 
consistency, he spent his life in improving the field batteries by humiliating 
and persecuting the horse artillery. Scharnhorst, on the other hand, re¬ 
garding the field batteries as a respectable branch of the garrison artillery, 
exhausted all his resources in exalting the horse artillery by trampling the 
field batteries under foot. It is melancholy to look back on the unprofitable 
and unreasonable contentions of these really able men. Had they gone 
hand-in-hand—as the leaders of the horse artillery and the field batteries 
should ever go; had they been able to lift up their eyes and look upon 
the field artillery as a whole, instead of concentrating all their attention 
upon one branch of it; had they understood that the interests of the horse 
artillery and field batteries are identical, instead of being antagonistic; then 
their efforts would have been crowned with success, and they would have 
left the Prussian field artillery the first in Europe. As it was, their labour 
was to a great extent unproductive; for the exertions of the one were almost 
entirely neutralised by the counter-exertions of the other, like 
“ . . two spent swimmers that do cling together, 
And choke their art.” 2 3 
Scharnhorst, however, survived Templehoff. 8 His power was thus for some 
time unchecked, and his influence consequently intensified, in some degree, 
the effect of the general causes which conspired to depress the field batteries 
all over Europe. The result was that the Prussian field batteries were well 
nigh unfit for service. 
After the peace of Basle, 1795, all progress and improvement ceased in 
the Prussian artillery, and it entered upon a glacial period of inactivity and 
torpor resembling that through which the Erench artillery passed before 
Gribeauval appeared. In 1799 this period of stagnation was interrupted by 
a re-organisation founded on the principle—false to the core—that one 
company should man two batteries. Every practical consideration seems to 
have been forcibly thrust out of sight in framing the new scheme, which 
rendered it almost impossible to carry on the duties of the arm in the field. 
Eield officers 4 commanded batteries they had never seen before, and the 
fifth officer of a company 5 was made Adjutant, whether he was fit or not. 
The bitter experiences of 1806 and 1807, however, when all the failings and 
shortcomings that had been nourished and cherished during a long peace were 
brought to light, taught the Prussian artillery officers lessons never to be 
forgotten. During these unfortunate wars, it required the unsleeping- 
vigilance of the officers to prevent the batteries from breaking down alto¬ 
gether. In the executive knowledge of their own profession, in a knowledge 
1 “ Die Beziehungen Friedrich des Grossen zu seiner Artillerie.” Von Troschke, pp. 17-18. 
££ Ueber Iieitende Artillerie, &e.,” passim. ££ Geschichte des Geschiitzwesens, &c.” C. von 
Decker, p. 155. 
2 Macbeth. 
3 Templehoff died in 1807; Scharnhorst was killed in 1813. 
4 ££ Staabsofficiere.” 
5 ££ Staabs-Kompagnie.” 
