THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
223 
Vast sums may be spent, vast debts may be incurred, in the construction of 
railways, harbours, telegraphs, &c., &c., but this expenditure may be, and 
generally is, productive; for the objects on which the money is spent are 
“ sources of annual revenue and advantage/” 1 2 War expenditure, however, 
is necessarily unproductive. There is nothing to show for it; and the money 
thus spent is as irretrievably lost as if it were cast into the depths of the 
unfathomable ocean. 
But the cost in money by no means represents the total loss of wealth 
sustained by a nation involved in war. “ What encourages the progress of 
population and improvement, encourages that of real wealth and greatness/” 3 
War, consequently, diminishes the wealth and decreases the absolute, 
though not necessarily the relative greatness of a nation; because it retards 
improvement, and is a deadly enemy to the progress of population. 
The following figures will give some notion of the frightful loss of 
life occasioned by the wars of the present century:—M. de Pradt esti¬ 
mates the Prench loss in the six Peninsular campaigns, 1808-14, at 
600,000 men. During the Crimean campaign 785,000 men were killed 
in battle, or died of wounds or disease. In the Italian war, 1859, 45,000 
lives were sacrificed. The Pederal armies lost 281,000 men during the 
civil war, 1861-66; the Confederate armies 519,000. The total loss in the 
■war of 1866 w r as 45,000. 3 
It is not too much, then, to say that every state in Europe was more or 
less impoverished by the wars of the Trench Eevolution and Empire; it is 
not too much too infer that the lavish expenditure of men and money oc¬ 
casioned by these desperate and prolonged campaigns proved a formidable 
barrier to the extension of horse artillery beyond certain limits. 
II.—The second cause that acted favourably for the field batteries, was the 
diminished efficacy of fire at which the increased rapidity of manoeuvre of the 
horse artillery was necessarily purchased. Hurried into existence at a moment 
when the whole atmosphere of Europe was heavy with war, it is not sur¬ 
prising that at first but little enquiry was made about the capabilities of the 
flying artillery; and its brilliant and successful action was quite sufficient 
to stifle any little enquiry that might have been set on foot. Trench com¬ 
manders were calling for horse artillery, and nothing but horse artillery; 
its influence in Prussia was paramount; and an English political officer in 
1809 reported to his Government that a force of flying artillery and cavalry 
would suffice to drive the Trench from Spain ! 4 But a few years' experience 
in the field opened men's eyes to the fact that the rapidity of manoeuvre of field 
artillery ultimately depends upon the simple mechanical principle of Work. 
Let W be the total weight behind a team of horse artillery horses, and W' 
the total weight behind a team of field battery horses. Let the teams, 
which consist of an equal number of horses in either case, be applied, for 
equal times, to draw the guns at constant velocities. Now, since the teams, 
and consequently their powers of traction, are equal, and they are applied 
1 Prof. Thorold Roger’s “ Political Economy,” p. 298. 
2 Adam Smith’s “Wealth of Nations.” Roger’s Ed. Vol. II. p. 146. 
3 “Cotemporary Wars,” p. 55. 
4 Napier’s “ Peninsular War.” Vol. II. 
