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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF 
delicacy of the question, and absence of any authoritative expression of 
opinion on the subject, have alone prevented it being mooted either here 
or at the United Service Institution. I think you will acquit me of 
adopting a strained interpretation which the words were not intended to 
convey, in saying that the following paragraph in the Adjutant-General's 
report on the organisation of the Royal Artillery presented to Parliament, 
dated 28th May, 1872, contemplates an interchange of ideas on this 
matter by the officers of the regiment. 
Para. 2.—“You will observe that on most points considerable difference 
of opinion exists; but, on the other hand, that there is a general unanimity 
as to its being undesirable to abandon a system which, notwithstanding 
certain anomalies, has been in operation since 1859, without any real 
break down, and without any unanimous suggestion being submitted for the 
substitution of one on a better principle! 1 
Hence, I think that no fitter arena can be found for beating out our 
ideas on the subject, with a view to arriving at some unanimity , than 
within the walls of our own Institution. 
I shall now submit to you, as the answer to the question involved in 
the title of my paper, that the only true tactical basis for artillery is to 
be found in a suitable organisation; and further, pray your patience 
whilst endeavouring to determine what that organisation should be. 
First, it must be suited to the conditions of our own army; which 
precludes subserviency to either French or German model. 
Secondly, it must admit of the most skilful employment of artillery in 
the field. This involves facility of both dispersion and concentration. 
Thirdly, it should be simple; so that its requirements may be easily 
comprehended by the various administrative departments, and by 
officers of the other arms generally. 
Happily—to speak from a higher level than that of the professional 
soldier—the political and geographical situation of England is such as 
practically to banish the idea of our having to meet single-handed on 
the continent of Europe any great power; but we might have to furnish 
a contingent army. We need hardly anticipate such a change in our 
national policy as would lead us to try and maintain an army of even 
100,000 men on a European theatre of opeTationS. But there is still 
this necessity of every day—-to occupy India in such a manner as readily 
to repel all invaders, and to maintain our sovereignty there amidst any 
revolts within our own territory, and to protect a widely scattered colonial 
empire; further, to assist our fleet in the last struggle, should it ever 
occur, pro aris et focis. These considerations I think tend to shew that 
our army, and therefore our artillery, requires greater elasticity of organ¬ 
isation than is a necessity for a purely continental power. Concisely, 
they seek protection from the rigidity of iron armour; we from the more 
elastic strength of chain. Let us see then, if in organisation as well as 
in material, elasticity cannot be obtained without a sacrifice of strength. 
At page 13 “Equipment of Artillery/'’ we read in a foot note :—“It is 
proposed that a corps dWrmee consisting of about 12,000 men, should have 
altogether 48 guns—12 guns to accompany each division of infantry 
(5000 strong), 12 to be attached to the cavalry brigade, and 12 to be 
in reserve: thus giving 3 guns per 1000 men.” This seems to have been 
determined after the Crimean war; for at the Alma we had only 60 guns 
