THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
283 
to about 29,000 men—a little over 2 guns per 1000 men, and the whole 
allied army had less than 3 guns per 1000 men; while at Waterloo we 
had less than 2 guns per 1000 men. I have extracted from the official 
account of the Franco-Prussian war, 1870-71, translated from the German 
by Capt. Clarke, the following information respecting the strength of the 
corps and divisions of the combatants :•—A French division consisted of 
13 battalions (one of which was a rifle battalion), 12 guns, 6 mitrailleuses, 
1 company of engineers. A corps was constituted of a variable aggre¬ 
gation of divisions, and had an artillery reserve in the proportion of 
about 12 guns to each division. There was besides a large artillery reserve 
of some 96 guns for the whole army. The cavalry was organised separately 
by divisions. A Prussian division usually consisted of 12 battalions of 
infantry, 4 squadrons of cavalry, 24 guns, and 1 company of pioneers. A 
corps was constituted of two of these divisions; and besides the above, to 
one division was added a battalion of rifles, and to the other one more 
company of pioneers. There was a reserve or corps of artillery to 
each army corps, of, usually, 36 guns. The total of a corps d’armee was thus 
25 battalions, 8 squadrons, 3 companies of pioneers, and 8 batteries of 
divisional artillery, besides six batteries of corps artillery. The cavalry 
division was organised separately, and had its own complement of artillery. 
The chief points of difference were, that the French had no unit of organ¬ 
isation beyond the division, while the Prussians had that of the corps d’armee 
of 2 divisions. The whole of the French cavalry was organised into 
separate brigades or divisions; while the Prussians had, besides such 
divisions, 8 squadrons at the disposal of each corps commander. The 
French corps commander of 2 divisions had only at his disposal 48 guns 
and 12 mitrailleuses, while the Prussian had 84 guns. I apprehend the 
system which gave a full reserve artillery to the corps commander, was 
more likely to produce effective results than that which limited his 
reserve for the sake of keeping a reserve of 96 guns for the disposal of 
the commander of an army of 300,000 men. 
From this comparison of the foregoing establishments, it would seem that 
for any European operations we shall be compelled to approximate the size 
of our divisions and corps to those of our neighbours. To oppose a force 
made up of two corps d’armee , comprising 4 divisions and 8 brigades, to 
one of equal strength, organised as one corps d’armee, containing only 2 divi¬ 
sions and 4 brigades, would be to handicap ourselves heavily at the outset. 
From a recent general order issued in FI ovember last, such approximation 
seems to be contemplated, pointing as it does to divisions of 3 brigades of 
4 battalions each. The general order, while going minutely into the 
subject of infantry movements, is much less explicit as to the cavalry and 
artillery duties. Indeed, I am inclined to think it would be to the 
benefit of the army generally were the constitution of a division and 
corps, d’armee clearly laid down for us by authority, as it is in the Prussian 
service; for I apprehend that no general, reading this order, would 
discover what force of cavalry and artillery he might expect to have placed 
under his orders, much less how they would be divided between the division 
and reserve. Until such proportions are definitely laid down, the subject 
seems properly open to discussion. 
For European warfare, I conceive the Prussian organisation to 
be worthy of adoption, excepting that I should prefer the divi- 
