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sional artillery consisting of only 1*2 guns per division, and increas¬ 
ing the reserve proportionally; that is to say, the divisional artillery 
of a corps d’armee should consist of 24 gnns instead of 48, and the reserve 
of 60 gnns instead of 36. I also think it might be convenient for the 
cavalry complement of artillery to join the reserve when not actually 
required to act with the cavalry—a change which the Prussians have 
introduced since the war. It will be observed that the artillery is 
calculated at about 3 guns per 1000 men. Now, while there are circum¬ 
stances under which this proportion might advantageously be increased, 
there are, on the other hand, times when it would be inconveniently large; 
and it would be a very serious blunder to encumber an army with more 
guns than, from the nature of the country it was working over, it could be 
expected to bring into action. Nor can it be too strongly insisted upon 
that a gun limbered-up is a weakness and anxiety to an army ; an evil 
which becomes aggravated when the said gun has to be dragged about 
in the train of an army with a very remote chance of being wanted in 
action. Therefore, I have advocated 2 batteries (12 guns) per division 
as the permanent proportion, as they can easily be reinforced to double 
that number from the reserve, when desirable. 
Prom the foregoing, I do not wish to be understood as advocating 
the maintenance of our whole army in such an organisation; nor does 
the consideration of how far we should keep the framework of it on foot 
lie within the scope of this paper. I would merely suggest for those 
who hold views on the subject, the unique advantage we possess in our 
insular position—enabling us at the first breath of war to fill up our 
divisions and corps unmolested, and embark them complete for any 
theatre of operations beyond the sea. So that probably we do not 
require to live in so completely organised a condition as our neighbours. 
Now, although there seems to be in the present day the same fascina¬ 
tion exercised by German military ideas as there was a few years ago 
by French, I think we should shew ourselves to be less wise than our 
neighbours did we attempt to make ours, as it were, a thoroughly 
Germanized army. Their organisation we may concede to be the best 
yet discovered for a large continental power raised by the sword, living 
by the sword, and may be some day to perish by the sword—a power 
that has assumed such a position in Europe that its existence depends 
upon its ability to cope, single-handed and at short notice, with the vast 
power of Russia, or with such an upheaval of the French nation as the 
close of last century witnessed, or with any attempt at disruption 
amongst her present constituent atoms. Now, this in no way reflects 
the situation of England; and it would be a bad day for us, should 
admirers of the German military system curse this free country with so 
vast a military organisation—an organisation admirable from a strictly 
military point of view, but lamentable from every other. ^ 
Believing that artillery forms one branch of science, complete in itself, 
I conceive that it would be a blunder at the outset to divide the officers, as 
has been suggested in the a Times ” and “ Pall Mall Gazette,” into field 
and garrison; although the Germans have, I believe, lately done so. In 
a pamphlet translated from the German by Capt. Clarke, and issued from 
this Institution, this idea was discussed; but I failed to perceive any 
sufficient reason in favor of such a view, the reasons against such a course 
