THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
283 
These grand results were achieved, for the most part, by using artillery as 
an arm, in masses, under its own superior officers; instead of the orthodox 
plan of frittering away its strength by scattering it in batteries and half¬ 
batteries among the different brigades and divisions of the army, under the 
command of infantry and cavalry officers. It is little surprising, however, 
that this system of artillery tactics, though adopted by the Germans in 
1870-71 with brilliant success, 1 should be opposed, both in England and 
Erance, by a strong faction; for there is an unmistakeable tendency among a 
certain class of writers in both countries to heap discredit on everything re¬ 
lating to Napoleon, let alone his system of artillery tactics. His life was one 
vast sham, from the moment he first drew breath, until the dark hour when 
he— 
.trusting to his noblest foes, 
When earth was all too grey for chivalry, 
Hied of their mercies mid the desert sea; ” 2 * 
his rise was an accident; his victories were mere luck; and he fell at last 
only to the obscure level from which God and Nature had never meant him 
to rise. Be it so. The live ass may bray in safety over the dead lion. 
“ They fools counted his life madness, and his end to be without honour; but 
he is in peace.” 8 
III.—Bor an insular power like England, whose superficial area and 
population are considerably smaller than those of her continental neighbours, 
a large and powerful fleet is an absolute necessity. If she aims an offensive 
blow against an enemy, the transports in which her soldiers embark must sail 
under the protection of a strong fleet. If, on the other hand, an enemy 
meditates an invasion of her shores, the fleet becomes of greater importance 
than ever; for the first grand object naturally is, not to defeat him after he 
has landed, but to prevent him from ever effecting a landing. In fact, from 
whatever point of view the matter be regarded, the navy necessarily occupies 
the first and highest position among the warlike forces of an insular nation. 
If the policy of the nation be an offensive one, the fleet is of great import¬ 
ance ; if its policy be defensive, the fleet is of infinitely greater importance. 
It is easy, then, to understand the influence which the navy exerts upon 
the army in England, or in any insular country. The more the money 
and attention lavished upon the navy, the less, in general, the attention and 
money spent upon the army. Except in time of actual war, the more efficient 
the fleet, the safer men will consider their lives, their freedom, and their 
property—especially when the policy of the country is one of peace, retrench¬ 
ment, and non-intervention; and if peace lasts long enough, enthusiasts will 
1 The truth of this statement has been frequently denied by English writers; nevertheless I 
deliberately and unhesitatingly repeat it. On the tactics of the German artillery in 1870-71, see 
Lieut. Maurice’s “Wellington Prize Essay,” pp. 64,142; Verdy Duvernois, in the “Spectateur 
Militaire,” Yol. XXIII. p. 238: Boguslawski’s “Tactical Deductions,” pp. 24, 60; a review of 
the “ Infanterie, Artillerie, und Kavallerie im Gefecht, &c.,” by the Russian Baron Seddeler, in 
the “ Militair-Wochenblatt,” 30th Nov. 1872, p. 913; Riistow’s “ Krieg um die Rheingrenze, 1870,” 
Yol VI. p. 98, et seq.; and Hoffbauer’s “Die Deutsche Artillerie in den Schlachten bei Metz,” 
Yol. II. p. 99, &c. 
2 Mrs. E. B. Browning. 
2 The Book of Wisdom, Chap. V. v* 4; 
34 
