THE KOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
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behind but for the horses of the Irish Commissariat l 1 Eight days afterwards, 
and five days before the battle of Yimiero, he again complained that the 
artillery horses were not what they ought to be. " They have great merit in 
their way,” he says, " as cast horses of dragoons and Irish cart horses, 
bought at £12 each! but not fit for an army that, to be successful and carry 
things with a high hand, ought to be able to move.” 2 Such were the horses 
with which we began our SevenYears' War against the Erench,and the carriages 
were suitable to such animals. The pursuit of the enemy was not pressed 
after our first battle and first signal victory, Yimiero, because " the gun- 
carriages were so shaken as to be scarcely fit for service,” and the batteries 
were " so badly and scantily horsed that it was doubtful if they could keep 
up with the infantry in a long march.” 3 To complete the picture, the 
drivers were in a "disorganised state and wretched condition,” although 
their inefficiency and almost general misconduct had been "the constant 
subject of complaint since the formation of the corps,” in 1794. 4 
Erom the beginning to the end of the war, the practical failure of tlie wagon 
system was as clear as noonday. It was found impracticable to mount the 
gunners on the wagons—first, on account of the danger of bringing the 
ammunition under fire; and secondly, because the weight of the wagons, already 
great, was so increased by that of the gunners as to overpower the wagon-team. 5 
The result may be anticipated. " Few, if any, instances of mounting the men 
on the guns and carriages can be found to have occurred on service during 
the whole course of the war,” says Sir Augustus Erazer, " and many were the 
cases in which the guns were either not brought to the points where they 
were wanted, or arrived just after the moment of opportunity had escaped.” 6 
On the day after Salamanca, the immobility of a field battery well nigh 
caused a calamity which might have brought the war to an abrupt and 
disastrous end—the capture of Lord Wellington. We may feel certain that 
the accident was not due to any want of judgment or knowledge in the officer 
commanding the battery, for he was.one of the best artillerymen in the army— 
Capt. (afterwards Sir Eobert) Gardiner. " I happened,” says Sir Eobert, 
" to be employed in advance with a 9-pr. brigade, covered by the light infantry 
of the 1st division.We were far in advance of the main 
body of the army, and on approaching a steep ascent, I discerned the Duke 
of Wellington on the summit, waving on the guns. We put out with all 
haste, and reaching the height, the duke pointed to a large body of French 
cavalry at a distance of five hundred yards, and only separated from him by 
an easy ravine. The horses, from the steepness of the ascent, could not 
measure their power in draught to the slow pace of the gunners (on foot); the 
gunners could not hasten theirs to that of the horses. It was a critical 
1 Dispatch, Lavos, 8tli Aug. 1808. 
2 Dispatch, Caldas, 16th Aug. 1808. 
3 Napier’s “Peninsular War,” Yol. I. pp. 140, 164. 
4 Sir A. Frazer’s “Remarks, &c.” p. 72. 
5 On the 12th Aug. 1860, at Sinho, in China, the wagons of the three 6-pr. guns stuck fast in the 
heavy mud; and when the guns got into position, there were not more than a handful of the gunners 
with them, the rest being scattered all over the plain in rear. Subsequently, the wagons had to be 
temporarily abandoned, and the gunners accompanied the guns—which were attached to Rattle’s 
cavalry brigade—mounted on the wagon horses. 
6 Sir A. Frazer’s “ Remarks, &c.” pp. 44, 57. 
