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MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OP 
There conld be nothing better than this, unless the enemy should 
suffer our guns to take up a position whence they conld enfilade him. 
5. There conld be no proper combination of the two arms if the 
infantry were to attack on a greater front than the front of two 
battalions. 
If the infantry attack were made on a front of three battalions, or of 
1200 paces, gnus placed 600 paces wide on a flank, and at a distance 
of 1000 yds. measured perpendicularly to the front of the enemy, would 
be firing at a range of 1400 yds. upon the front of the enemy opposite 
to the centre of the attack; and the guns could not continue to fire 
upon the front of the enemy opposite to the centre of the attack after 
the head of the attack had come to within 500 yds. of the enemy. The 
guns could not be placed so as to cover the advance of our infantry to 
close quarters. 
Defence. 
6. The divisional artillery ought, for the most part, to be placed in 
front, in line with the foremost infantry, on the ground intended to be 
defended. 
Guns ought to be placed in front, that they may fire upon the enemy 
as soon as he comes within range, and that they may never be pre¬ 
vented from crossing their fires in front of the defence. The use of 
guns in a line attacked by infantry is to prevent the enemy from 
forming his supports and reserves in column. If we had no guns in 
front, the enemy would advance his supports and reserves in columns. 
Columns, preceded by a thick firing line, would be his safest formation 
under musketry fire; and the pressure and rush of his columns would 
be hard to beat in the assault. 
Guns ought generally to be distributed along the front of a position 
in the proportion of one battery to two battalions. There might be 
favourable points where it would be advantageous to place more than 
one battery; and there might be more than the length of two battalions 
of front, where it would be useless to place guns. 
7. Guns placed in front of a position ought not to be retired in face 
of an infantry attack. 
The guns ought not to be retired, because they most clearly mark 
the line of the defence ; because their withdrawal must unsteady and 
discourage our infantry at a critical moment ; and because they would 
be wanted in front. The guns must be served to the last. 
The teams might be unhooked and retired. Infantry could lie 
between the guns, and close up in their rear, to protect them. The 
attack of the enemy would make for the infantry between the batteries, 
and not for the batteries themselveSi 
Shounclippe, 
May 22, 1873, 
