THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
429 
importance or merit, even in field warfare;” adding afterwards tliat 
they “ cannot too strongly insist on tlie importance of not confounding 
mitrailleurs with artillery, as much, on account of their effect, as the 
proper nature of their employment.” 
Our first conclusion (p. 425), seems to be borne out, in so far as mitrail¬ 
leurs have been shown to be terrible weapons under certain circumstances. 
It has been shown also that it would be most unadvisable to replace 
even a single field gun by such a machine. But then comes the 
question, whether by taking into the field a certain proportion of this 
fire-arm we gain “an advantage commensurate with the additional 
expense and trouble, and the addition to the impedimenta of an army.” 
This question cannot well be answered without considering the 
proper tactical use of mitrailleurs, and the organisation necessary for 
field service. 
Tactical Use of Mitrailleurs. 
In answer to questions on the subject, General Walker, who was 
with the Prussians throughout the war, says :—“ Where is the tactical 
place of the mitrailleur ? I believe the mitrailleur likely to prove effect 
tive as a gun of position in street fighting, in the defence of villages, 
of defiles, and in the flanks of permanent works; but I could not 
consent to spare one single field gun from the proportion of artillery 
adopted in this country as proper for field operations for the purpose 
of replacing it by a mitrailleur. I think that the mitrailleur might 
prove very effective if employed against a half-disciplined enemy, in¬ 
adequately supplied with field artillery; but its effectiveness presupposes 
that the opponent is obliged to advance on the narrow front which is 
covered by its range.” 
Colonel Hamley, critically considering the subject, writes 
“ The question of employing the mitrailleuse may, in a great measure, 
be argued without further reference to the experience of war, because 
all the circumstances on which efficiency depends have been ascertained 
by experiment and by the testimony of observers, except one—namely, 
the frequency with which opportunities for its effective action may be 
expected to occur; and even that may be fairly estimated without 
actual experience. 
“ In the case of an army about to attack, it is more than ever desirable 
to precede the advance of troops by a concentrated fire of artillery. 
If Gatling mitrailleuses were used for this purpose, they must move 
forward to within 1200 yds. of the enemy's line. As they could not 
always—perhaps not often—choose sheltered ground for their position, 
they would, while taking it up, and afterwards, be exposed to the 
enemy's artillery at easy range. Even if protected from this, their own 
fire would generally be directed on troops secured from it, either by 
obstacles already existing, or by those constructed for the purpose. 
For this end, therefore, they may be pronounced absolutely useless, 
and must be left out of the account in considering offensive operations. 
