476 
MINUTES OF FKOCEEDINGS OF 
position near Ars Laquenav. The advanced guard of the 7th German Corps 
attacked them vigorously, using two light batteries to cannonade the buildings 
near Colombey, and drove the defenders out. The Trench then made a 
partial deployment, and assaulted the troops of the advanced guard with 
very superior forces. In spite of the strong attack, the troops of General 
Golz held their ground for hours, till the arrival of the main German 
forces made the action general. 
As another instance, the action of the advanced guard of the 24th Saxon 
Division at Sedan may be noticed. Capturing the village of La Moncelle, 
the infantry pushed across the Givonne rivulet, taking possession of detached 
houses on the west bank, forming a sort of tete de pont position, which was 
maintained for three hours under the most trying circumstances. At the 
same time, the light battery of the advanced guard deployed on the eastern 
side of the Givonne valley, and opened fire on the long lines of the enemy 
visible on the western heights. This single battery maintained its position 
unaided against a very superior force, till reinforced by the divisional 
artillery. 1 
It is always advisable, if possible, to bring three batteries into action, on 
account of the mutual support they offer each other. The commencement 
of the battle of Woerth illustrates the value of this combined action. Two 
advanced guard batteries of the 21st (German) Division w^ere opposed in 
front and flank by five Trench batteries, and were in danger of giving way. 
By the co-operation, however, of the nearest battery of the 5th Corps they 
were enabled to hold their ground, and, in consequence, took subsequently 
an important part in the fight. 2 
When a plan of action is decided upon, the intelligent co-operation of the 
artillery depends chiefly on the abilities of its commander. If the guns 
are to be used to the greatest advantage, they must be worked in intimate 
relation with the requirements of the other arms. The senior officer of 
the artillery should therefore be with the commander of the advanced guard 
during the movements prior to the action, and constantly refer to him while 
the combat is going on. 
It is advisable to employ artillery in divisions when practicable, on 
account of the facility of transmitting orders. 3 In the case of a single 
battery, the Major would be with the Commandant, and the battery prac¬ 
tically be under command of a Subaltern, often at the most critical moment. 4 
A field battery, besides, cannot well spare more than one trumpeter to act 
as an orderly. If a division is employed, the Lieut.-Colonel would be with 
the Commandant, have sufficient orderlies, and the efficiency of the indi¬ 
vidual batteries would not be diminished. It is, of course, impossible to 
avoid the employment of single batteries in advanced guards, but the evil is 
none the less apparent. 
This facility of transmission of orders is also embraced in the vexed 
question of whether batteries should be employed massed or dispersed, for 
both of which there are able advocates. 5 
1 “Franco-German War,” Borbstaedt. 
2 Official account. 
3 In our service, usually from two to three batteries. 
4 The Captain being with third line of wagons. 
5 “ The old dispute between massing guns or concentrating the fire of separated batteries, is held 
by all who have seen war on a modern scale as unpractical. So many guns are brought into action 
