THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
477 
Take the ordinary case of two or three advanced guard batteries ordered 
to concentrate their fire on some special point. It will often happen that 
this is not visible from the different positions the batteries, if dispersed, 
would take up. It is evident that both time and ammunition are saved by- 
batteries being placed near enough to communicate freely, as to range, &c., 
with each other. In addition to ease of transmission of orders, it must .be 
remembered that the advanced guard artillery expects to be strongly rein¬ 
forced by the guns of the main body of the army. If the batteries are not 
kept well together, the probable mixture of different commands, resulting 
from the advance of the divisional artillery, could only lead to confusion. 
Whatever, then, may be the advantages of dispersion of batteries—and no 
doubt they are occasionally great—the last-named reason is sufficient to 
condemn the application of that principle to advanced guards. Occasionally 
—particularly in a defensive action—circumstances admit of a battery taking 
an enemy in flank. This will seldom be advisable with a force of less than 
three batteries, but when employed the effect is very great, and warrants the 
detachment of a battery. * 1 2 This seems a case where horse artillery could be 
used to advantage, if at hand. 
The principle of massing guns applies most strongly against the sub¬ 
division of a battery. There are exceptional cases, however, when it is 
necessary—such as the passage of defiles, destruction of obstacles, small 
reconnaissances, &c. In such cases, guns should be detached by divisions, 
and not half-batteries. 3 
At the commencement of an engagement, it is often difficult to determine 
the amount of resistance the enemy is prepared to offer. The forms which 
the combat may assume vary accordingly, but they may be divided into two 
general phases. 
Firstly. The offensive combat. 
Secondly. The defensive combat. 
If the enemy has drawn up his troops, and is apparently under the 
intention of adopting the defensive, the artillery of the advanced guard has 
to commence the action and prepare the way for the attack. 
The fight should rarely be commenced at a distance of more than 
3000 paces. 3 Artillery has a natural tendency to open fire at too long 
ranges—a failing especially prominent in the campaign of 1866. 
The Elbe army at Sedowa did nothing but exchange shots with the 
enemy at 4000 or 5000 paces. 4 In the defile actions of the Crown Prince's 
army, in the same campaign, a similar tendency was apparent, and in all of 
them the want of effective artillery action was felt. The fear of losing guns, 
at once, that the only difficulty is how to find positions for them.”—Lecture at IT.S.T. by Major 
Brackenbury, R.A.; R.A.I. paper by Major Strangways ; Hohenlohe. “It is found best to concen¬ 
trate batteries in masses, near enough to each other to be subject to single direct control, and to 
give each other the benefit of any experience gained as to range and effect.”—“ Operations of 
War,” Hamley. 
1 “ Ce moyen est plus efficace que celui qui se bornerait a renforcer le front de la position.”—Yon 
Waldersee. 
2 “Minor Tactics of Field Artillery,” Captain Hime, R.A. 
3 Hohenlohe, to whom constant reference is hereafter made. 
4 “ Tactical Retrospect,” May; 
The Offen¬ 
sive Combat. 
