480 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF 
The Defen¬ 
sive Combat. 
will often have to advance rapidly to reach some favourable spot . 1 To attain 
this with safety, there is a necessity for a temporary escort (usually cavalry). 
As the attack progresses, one flank of the guns will be protected by the 
advance, the other flank generally remaining in want of support till the 
main body of the army comes up and envelopes both flanks. The question 
of suitable support for the artillery is a difficult one, and will be treated 
further on. 
The main principles which regulate the tactics of the advanced guards of 
a corps and a division are similar. In the former case, however—where the 
force is a larger one—it is evident that the vanguard (supplied with artillery), 
will come into action first. This will be supported by the main body of the 
advanced guard, and eventually by the corps. But with the corps, a new 
force comes into play—the reserve or corps artillery. These guns are 
directly under the command of the commander of the corps. To them is 
entrusted the work of screening the advance of the main body, and by 
coming into action with the advanced guard, concealing the intended main 
attack . 2 The divisional artillery can seldom separate itself from the main 
body, and confines its efforts to the local objects of the fight. "When the 
main attack is directed towards a part of the field where the advanced guard 
is not engaged, it is prepared by the corps artillery, assisted generally by the 
divisional; but the advanced guard batteries confine their efforts to their 
original object. 
“ Defensive fights are, as a rule, with regard to their design and to the 
employment of artillery, far easier than offensive ones; although in the prac¬ 
tical carrying out they are infinitely more difficult ."” 3 When an advanced 
guard assumes the defensive, it is prepared to be attacked by considerably 
superior numbers. The moral effect of a retreat is so bad, that every effort 
must be made to stand firm and not give way—a task rendered easier by 
the certainty of eventual support from the advancing main body. When 
the attacking force is very superior, the distance between the advanced 
guard and main body should be diminished, to facilitate support. With 
a properly organised force, the advanced guard should never give way. 
Without entering into the vexed question of how far the attack and defence 
have severally benefited by the introduction of the modern arms of precision , 4 
it may be taken for granted that the “ temporary retaining power of a rela¬ 
tively small number of men has largely increased .” 5 
This is more notably the case where reinforcements are expected—-as in 
the case of advanced guards. The greatest danger a small body of troops 
is subjected to, is the liability of being turned on the flanks. This would 
1 A distance of from 500 to 1000 paces.—Taubert, Hohenlohe. Hamley assigns 800 yds. 
2 “ La plus grande faute que l’on,puisse commettre est de conserver a l’ar tiller ie, meme a, celle du 
corps d’armee, le role d’une reserve.”—Becker, “ Field Artillery in 1870-1.” 
3 Hohenlohe. 
4 In most of the arguments on this subject, the tendency has been to discuss the general question 
of attack and defence, where the new arms are employed, and not separate the distinct influence 
modern weapons have on the relations that have always existed between them (vide Moltke’s 
pamphlet). In 1870, roughly speaking, the French losses were half the German when on the 
defensive, and in the proportion of ten to three on assuming the offensive. Does not this exceed 
considerably the relative proportions of former days ? The attack, again, has undoubtedly gained 
in the ability to advance supported by the fire of stationary troops. 
5 “ Wellington Essays” 
