484 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF 
Special 
Advanced 
Guards. 
or march with the guns, but would accompany them at the order of their 
commander, when occasion arises. The compromise is unsatisfactory, as at 
the time of greatest need there would be the most difficulty in getting troops 
to perform this thankless office. The question is not yet properly solved; 
and till it is, the artillery of the future must play their prominent part sub¬ 
ject to great risk. 1 2 
A passing glance may be taken at the specially organised advanced guards 
that will probably play an important part in future warfare. 
These will generally be formed of horse artillery batteries attached to the 
scouting cavalry of an army, or a detachment from the corps cavalry and 
artillery. The efficacy of their employment can, perhaps, best be realised by 
a description of the brilliant exploit of the horse artillery at the battle of 
Mars la Tour. A brigade of cavalry with four horse artillery batteries was 
ordered to advance towards Yionville, and compel the deployment of the 
Trench troops. The batteries galloped boldly ahead of the cavalry and 
unlimbered. The Trench outposts had scarcely signalled the approach of 
the Germans, when the encampments of both Tortoids and Vallebregue's 
divisions were overwhelmed with shells. Thirty-four Trench squadrons and 
four batteries were so completely surprised that, though very superior in 
numbers, they retreated as quickly as possible. The “ enemy was thus 
induced to deploy two entire corps d’armee on a line of battle facing west,” 3 
(this being a totally false direction to give the front, as the Prussian main 
body was advancing from the south). The great defect these advanced 
guards labour under is that they require a powerful escort, and cavalry 
cannot always be spared for that duty. 
Such then, briefly, are the considerations forced upon us by the theories 
of the most modern tactical writers, founded on the experience of the only 
wars in which the influence of modern weapons has been felt. The circum¬ 
stances of civilised warfare have alone been considered, and continental 
nomenclature used for the units that England does not possess. 3 Un¬ 
doubtedly, much of the reasoning does not apply to the warfare usually 
carried on by British troops. In the suppression of an Indian mutiny, or in 
the many little wars in which Great Britain is so frequently involved, a 
strict adherence to European tactics would probably be a mistake. Civilised 
warfare must, however, be always the model, to which the genius of a com¬ 
mander can make necessary variations in exceptional cases. 
In the case of small bodies of troops, the detachment to an advanced 
1 I cannot help thinking that the future place of the mitrailleuse will be among the bat¬ 
teries of artillery; not formed in batteries of its own, nor superseding a single gun, but disseminated 
among them. The French mitrailleuse used in the last war was nearly as heavy as a field gun; it 
had no lateral spread of fire, and its use was but imperfectly understood. When applicable to the 
ground, and efficiently used, the effect however was terrible, as witnessed in several of the battles. 
There are now similar weapons, in which lightness and spread of fire are combined; and which can 
discharge 400 to 600 shots a minute. Suppose one of these, drawn by two horses, was attached to 
a battery; it would be escort enough in itself. Where more than one battery is in position, 
effective cross fire could be maintained. With two-horse wagons for ammunition, the additional 
impedimenta to an army would be trifling; and I think this weapon, owing to its mobility and 
efficient defensive power, would be the most effectual escort to the artillery of the future. Whether 
they should further play a more prominent part in war, is beyond the present question. 
2 “ Franco-German War,” Borbstaedt. 
3 Army and corps. 
