26 
AUSTRIAN MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY IN BOSNIA. 
13tli Corps (6th, 7 th, and 20th Divisions) received a corps artillery of 
two light and two heavy field batteries. The superior mobility of the 
divisions provided with mountain batteries was very evident; but 
unfortunately considerations of expense and rapidity of mobilisation 
prevented all the divisions which were successively mobilised in 
August, after the check of Szapary's division, from being equipped in 
this manner. By the time they entered Bosnia, however, many of the 
roads had been greatly improved by the untiring exertions of the 
pioneers, so the want of mountain batteries was not so much felt. 
V.—Tactics. 
The manner in which the Austrian guns were handled in the war in 
Bosnia forms a glaring contrast to the unintelligent and clumsy em¬ 
ployment of the same arm by the Russians in 1877-8. Those latter, 
judging from the mutual admiration and Kameradschaft which existed 
between Germany and Russia (now considerably cooled down, how¬ 
ever), might have been expected to have copied the tactics of the 
German artillery. Exactly the reverse happened. Dispersion of guns 
and dispersion of fire seem to have been the principles which ruled 
the handling of their batteries. The Austrians, while professing no 
such warm friendship and admiration, did not disdain to take a lesson 
from the Prussian artillery, to which they proved so superior twelve 
years before (1866), and had studied the artillery tactics of the war of 
1870-1 ; and in every battle and combat of the Occupation we see those 
tactics applied and carried out, although, of course, on a very much 
smaller scale. 
The fact was recognised by them that artillery is an indispensable 
adjunct to infantry, and we therefore find that every column, however 
small, had always a few guns with it. During the advance of the 
6th Division from Doboi to Zepce, on either flank was detached a 
column consisting of two battalions and two guns, and these marched 
by paths about four to six miles distant from and parallel to the main 
route. How useful these guns were for opening defiles, &c., is proved 
by the engagement of the right column near Maglai on the 5th August. 
The troops had to march in single file in places, and near Maglai the 
path was held by insurgents. The two guns were at once brought 
into action, and the road cleared without further fighting. The same 
happened on the 7th near Noviseher, where a battalion of Turkish 
regulars was forced to retire by the same means. Had no artillery 
accompanied the small column, it must have become engaged in a 
difficult combat, which would have prevented its timely attack on the 
left flank of the insurgents at Zepce. The same proceeding is also 
noticeable in Villecz's turning movement on Han Belalovac on the 
16th August. The single mountain batteries attached to small 
columns operating by narrow and bad roads must therefore push 
forward with boldness, and be always ready to open the way for the 
infantry or cover their deployment. The position of artillery in the 
column of march is the same in mountainous regions as on the plains. 
