28 
AUSTRIAN MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY IN BOSNIA. 
light troops for artillery in the mountains, as the facilities for surprise 
are so much greater than on the plains. 
The employment of artillery on the battle-field appears to have been 
governed by the principles systematised by the German artillery. In 
all cases we see the advanced guard artillery brought at once into 
action, and the artillery mass gradually formed, and covering the 
deployment of the long columns. The ground rarely permitted of all 
the guns being united in a grande batterie, but in general they were all 
employed for the attainment of one object, though brought into action 
at different points. In the battle of Zepce, on the 7th August, the 
two mountain batteries of the advanced guard were brought into 
action together at 2000 paces range, and were shortly afterwards 
joined by a light field battery, which, not being able to find a position 
in line with them, had to advance to closer quarters. These three 
batteries first silenced the enemy's guns, and then turned their fire on 
the Han (inn), held by the insurgents, while the infantry deployed 
for the attack. At Kogelje, on the 5th August, the advanced guard 
battery was brought into action at 1400 paces, and when the in¬ 
surgents were driven from their first position by the infantry of the 
advanced guard, this battery was advanced to 1600 paces from their 
second position, where a battery from the main body joined it. From 
here a heavy fire was brought to bear on the Kula (a stone block¬ 
house), which formed the key of this position. After it was stormed, 
one of the batteries was advanced to the captured position, to aid in 
the pursuit. 
We see the same employment of artillery in the first day's battle 
(9th August), at Dolni Tuzla, where two heavy batteries were brought 
to bear on the enemy's guns, although from different points, and then 
the fire of both was turned on the strong posts of his line. 
Again, at the capture of Serajevo, on the 19th August, towards 
11 a.m., when the Austrian infantry were nearing the town from three 
sides, 52 field and mountain guns (all the artillery of the two columns) 
poured their shells on the devoted city. Of these, 24 field and 
16 mountain guns specially directed their fire on the castle—the centre 
of the enemy’s resistance. In the main artillery position to the west 
of Serajevo, on the Kosarsko Brdo, were three field and three mountain 
batteries—in all, 86 guns—all firing at the castle or citadel; range, 
3200 yds. One of these mountain batteries afterwards pushed forward 
to about 250 yds. from the edge of the town, where the gardens, &c., 
were strongly held by insurgents, and overwhelmed them with storms 
of case and shrapnel (reversed in the bore). The other batteries were 
with the flank columns. It had been previously arranged that as soon 
as those batteries got within range of the town, they were to open fire 
on it; and thus *a concentric fire on one object from many different 
points was obtained. 
The necessity of a good preparation by artillery fire is shown by the 
failure of the attack by the 3rd Kaiser Jagers on Kremenac, on the 
21st August. The battalion had to be withdrawn, after suffering 
heavily, and was forced to wait till the group of houses had been set 
on fire by the guns. 
