AUSTRIAN MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY IN BOSNIA. 
29 
In places batteries could not find positions near enough to the 
enemy's line to be effective; but this did not hinder them from 
coming into action and detaining part of the enemy's forces by a slow 
fire at long ranges : as at Kreraenac, on the 21st August, where a half¬ 
battery detained the enemy's left at 3770 paces while his right flank 
was being turned. 
The tendency to push forward guns to decisive ranges (second 
artillery position) is strongly shown in several actions. At Kosna, on 
the 4th August, the batteries of the advanced guard were pushed 
forward from their first position (1500 paces) to a second, 800 paces 
from the enemy's line; but here they arrived too late, owing to the 
difficulties of the ground, and could not come into action, as their 
front was masked by their own infantry. At Banjaluka, Citluk, and 
Zepce, where the last position was at 1000 paces, the same principle 
is applied; but with mountain batteries this proceeding seems of 
doubtful utility, as their progress is of necessity slow, and there is a 
great chance, as at Kosna, of their reaching the second position too 
late. 
Artillery was invariably used as a pivot on all occasions when a flank 
had to be turned. That this principle is fully recognised by the 
Austrians is seen from the orders of F. Z. M. Philippovic for the 
advance on Yranduk. He says :—■“ My intention is to carry out an 
enveloping attack, and leave the principal work to the flank columns, 
while the centre will have to carry on a demonstration, supported 
by strong artillery fire," and the same orders are again repeated for 
the advance on Han Belalovac. At Zaice, the enemy's left, which made 
several attempts to advance and envelope the Austrian right, was held 
in check by the fire of two mountain batteries, while the entire force 
changed front to its right, with the guns as a pivot, turned the 
insurgents' right, and drove them back on Zaice. Precisely the same 
proceeding was employed at Kremenac, where the army effected a 
change of front to its right, an artillery position being the pivot. 
Batteries were invariably advanced to the conquered position to fire 
on the retreating enemy. After Zepce, the retiring insurgents were 
shelled up to 4000 paces by the 10/XII. Field Battery. 
As regards the defensive battle, the insurgents showed great skill in 
placing their guns so as to command the approaches to their positions, 
but no examples of the defensive occurred on the Austrian side during 
the war. Szapary's retreat from Dolni Tuzla on the 10th August was 
covered by twelve guns, which held their position till the last body of 
infantry was withdrawn from the fighting line. At one time they 
were in great danger, as the insurgents threatened to storm them; 
but they ultimately succeeded in retiring by successive divisions. 
In a tactical point of view the campaign in Bosnia seems therefore 
to teach us that the employment of mountain artillery on the field of 
battle in no way differs in principle from the employment of the arm 
on the plains, but that it is all the more necessary to push guns to the 
front, to protect the deployment of a long column marching on one 
road, and, it may be, in single file in places, as often happened during 
the war. To effect the formation of the grande batterie as soon as 
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