30 
AUSTRIAN MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY IN BOSNIA. 
possible, it is therefore advisable to place the guns as far forward in 
the column of route as is consistent with their safety. 
In the mountains it is seldom that an entire division of from 6000 
to 9000 men can operate by one route or in one body; brigades will 
therefore frequently have to work independently. We pointed out 
above the benefit which accrued to the small Austrian flank columns 
from their being provided with guns, and comparing the organisation 
of the Austrian with that of the English divisions in Afghanistan, the 
system of the former of having four guns 'permanently attached to each 
brigade, and always accompanying it when detached, and also a 
divisional artillery of one or two batteries, appears preferable to ours 
of having all the artillery in one brigade division and under one 
command.^ 
The nature of the communications and the configuration of the 
country must greatly influence the question as to whether mountain 
guns only or a proportion of field artillery should be attached to 
divisions destined to operate in the mountains. The difficulties of the 
march in Bosnia were at times enormous. In the advance to Maglai, 
on the 5th August, in the right column the mountain guns with their 
stores had several times to be unpacked and carried by hand across 
streams with precipitous, rocky banks, while the mules crossed un¬ 
loaded. We have seen above how useful these guns proved afterwards. 
In the battle of Zaice a mountain battery had to be carried up by hand 
into a position, and then brought into action. There can be little or 
no doubt that the failure of S zap ary A advance on Dolni Tuzla was 
caused in no small measure by the organisation his division had 
received. He had only three heavy 9-centimetre field batteries, and 
it took five complete days to bring his batteries and train columns 
(with wheeled carriage) from Gradacac to Gracanica—a distance of 
30 kilometres (about 19 miles)—and still the road was no worse than 
those traversed by the 6th and 7th Divisions. In places 30-40 men 
had to be used to haul along each carriage. Thus three precious 
days were lost, and the insurgents gained time to concentrate at 
Dolni Tuzla. In the 6th Division, the two heavy batteries had to be 
left at Han Marica on the 3rd August, and their horses used to assist 
the train columns. They did not rejoin the division till after its 
arrival at Zenica on the 14th August. Still the advantage of having 
heavy batteries, as shown at Sarajevo and at Ali Musjid in Afghanistan, 
is enormous, and may in part counterbalance the delay caused on the 
line of march by their presence in a column. Mountain batteries 
should be able to go wherever a foot-soldier can march. 
The question is suggested by the experience of this campaign, 
Could not the materiel of mountain artillery be lightened ? For 
example, what is the use of wheels ? In the “ Bussian Artillery 
Journal^ of April, 1879, there is a review of a project for a mountain 
carriage without wheels, and a model of such a carriage was exhibited 
* The Austrians, of course, have an O. C. Artillery on the staff of the division, and the divisional 
artillery is directly under his orders. 
