OFFICE WORK OF A GARRISON BATTERY. 
59 
from an amount correctly credited to Government, an error or deficiency 
of the value would be shown, in the balance sheet as somewhere in the 
battery, in the Proof as somewhere in the men’s accounts. If, however, 
the gross item “ necessaries” were taken from the actual recoveries, then, 
if I understand the system rightly, the Proof would give no sign, as the 
overissue of pay would in the men’s accounts cover the loss, so that in 
this case the men would be protected, not the Major. A peculiar cash 
account and special rules have to be adopted, causing, I think, the 
abandonment of certain practical checks for a very small advantage, if, 
indeed, any one is really protected by the Proof. No book appears to 
exist on this system that would at once show the cash received by the 
Battery or the cash in the actual possession of the Major, unless he 
invariably keeps every penny in the bank or in the hands of his Pay- 
Sergeant ; so that it would require two books to show the whole receipts 
and expenditure. Great reliance appears to be put in the bank book, 
which must be often away from the Battery. 
97. All adopters of systems of any sort, simple or complicated, must 
be warned that not the slightest security from fraud is given by any 
form of accounts. The more complicated the check, the more it depends 
on the accounts not being cooked; while cooking accounts is the 
easiest thing possible. In any system, if all the items are correct in 
amount there is little loss to fear, while a single false entry would make 
every system useless. The practical difficulty with many officers is 
that they are not content to trust to a bald statement of their Pay- 
Sergeants as to the payments, while they are not prepared to go fully 
into the accounts. In either system described in paras. 95 and 96 
all depends on the totals being correctly arrived at and on the items being 
the real amount. If an officer is not prepared to go carefully into these 
details, if he is prepared to accept any figures, he may just as well take 
them in a plain form. Most officers have, or give, only a limited time 
to verify their accounts; that time will be best employed in checking the 
accounts at first hand, checking the ledger sheets themselves, and, above 
all, in watching over the cash and the cash payments. There are two 
steps in almost all the frauds a Major has to fear: first, the alteration of 
some item on paper—this he practically can hardly ever prevent; the 
next step is to get hold of the cash—this the Major can easily prevent. 
For example, one battery lost about three hundred pounds in their 
Savings Bank accounts, the operation lasting some years. The cross- 
totalling of the Savings Bank accounts offered .no hindrance; and I 
fail to see how any mere system of accounts could stop such frauds. A 
gunner withdrew £1 from the bank; the Pay-Sergeant withdrew £10, 
and produced the necessary receipt for £10 ; all the accounts totalled, 
all the vouchers were present, and all would have certainly passed the 
Proof” or “ cross-totalled ” systems. The practical check of seeing 
the cash paid to the man was not applied. The same remark will hold 
good for all the common frauds; for example, inserting false charges in 
accounts of deserters. If they are inserted, how is any one to get the 
cash if that is properly watched over ? Let any Major consider his 
own position : he is surrounded by a number of paper checks on every 
