640 
TACTICS OP THE THREE ARMS. 
at this critical moment—“that is to say, when the attack has been 
thoroughly prepared and the skirmishing line has crept up to assaulting 
distance, and is pouring in its utmost fire in those few deadly moments 
that precede the actual assault. 
Taking a battalion at a strength of 1,000, M. Mazel calculates on a 
parade of 800 effectives on service, and makes this his basis. 
From an extensive average of numerous battles, he finds that, in 
the fighting line, the troops actually engaged may lose as many as 
25 per cent, of their number during an attack. Taking this, therefore, 
as possibly the case, our 800 rifles would be reduced to 600 at the 
crisis; and 600 is therefore the number on which M. Mazel reckons, 
and for which he has to provide. 
Now, the question is, how to dispose of them ? 
By the help of an ingenious calculation, he gathers that the intervals 
from rifle to rifle should be 1\ yards as a maximum, and \ yard as a 
minimum. 
(As he always adopts round numbers in metres I have done the same 
in yards). 
The mean of the above gives 540 yds. as the front of a battalion. 
(Which, compared with our own regulations, is a very extensive front— 
the latter being laid down at 300 yds.) 
The front would be occupied in a very similar manner to that pre¬ 
scribed by our “ Field Exercise,” so I do not propose to discuss it at 
length. The front of a battalion being given, that for a division or 
corps follows directly. The only thing left to determine being the 
number of battalions in first line. 
With regard to this M. Mazel is again conspicuous by his aversion 
to depth. He is of opinion that having placed a battalion in first 
line on a front of 540 yds., there should be behind this a second line 
only . No third line. A general reserve he will allow to every body as 
a whole, but not a reserve to each component part. What he says, is, 
that if an army sets aside one or two corps as reserve, and each Corps 
Commander sets aside a division, and each Division Leader a regiment, 
there is no end to it, and these latter reserves become, in effect, third, 
and even fourth lines, of which the mischief is, that if the side, on 
which they are, is successful, they are useless—if beaten, probably more 
useless still, because the defeat will be due to an envelopment of both 
wings. 
Thus, then, allowing only a second line, whose duty is to fill up 
gaps in the first, its strength requisite for this purpose should be in 
the proportion of 1 to 2 of the front line. The regiment (French 
establishment) consisting of three battalions, we have a front for it of 
540 X 2 = 1080 yds., that is to say, it has two battalions in first line, and 
one in second line. 
Having, then, any body of which to determine the front, the first 
thing is to settle, the reserve, and then to divide the remainder of the 
battalions in the proportion of 1 to 2, and multiply the latter number 
by 540 for the front in yards. 
For example, a French Corps consists of eight regiments of the Line 
and one battalion of Chasseurs. 
