TACTICS OF THE THREE ARMS. 
641 
Let the general reserve be two regiments and the Chasseurs, this 
leaves six regiments for first and second lines, or a front of 6,480 yds. 
The limit laid down by French regulations is 2,250 yds. It is the 
object of the author to prove that reason is on his side, and that the 
front of 2,250 yds. is ridiculously small. The author’s limit gives 
4*63 men per yard. 
In an army of three Corps (of which one is in reserve) the front 
given by M. Mazel gives seven men per yard, which is a limit that he 
believes it is most unwise, if not unsafe, to exceed. (Speaking from 
memory, I believe Mac Mahon had 1\ per yard at Worth, and Bazaine 
8 at Gravelotte). M. Mazel then instances several of the battles of 
1870 in support of his theory. His arguments are always fair, and 
never over-strained. This part of his work is well worthy of attentive 
reading. 
He draws the conclusion that in future it will be found that frontal 
attacks are so costly and difficult that envelopment will be the only 
practicable method that can meet with success. 
Coming now to the question of Artillery, M. Mazel is entirely 
opposed, as might be expected of him, to the practice of crowding 
guns. He looks upon a closely concentrated battery as a regular 
shell-trap, and considers that the limit to the front of a battery should 
be determined by the power of the human voice—that is to say, the 
extent to which the Officer Commandng can make himself heard. 
This he takes to be 150 yds., or 30 yds. between the guns. 
Now, in the matter of the number of guns, our author working out 
the question, as is his wont, from the beginning, says that the real 
limit is the number that can be put in line. He objects entirely to 
the system of “so many guns per thousand,” which is the usual 
method of computation. 
He says that the place for guns is on the crests, while that of 
Infantry in first line is either half way down the slope or at the foot 
of the latter, so that the guns can never get in the way of the 
Infantry. He is also of opinion that if guns are not to be trusted to 
fire over the heads of the Infantry, the sooner some new shells and fuzes 
are introduced the better. He therefore works out the number of guns 
for a Corps to be 20 batteries, and the distribution to be as follows, 
viz.:—- 
1. Corps Artillery. | 2. Army Artillery. 
It will be seen that he abolishes divisional artillery. The reasons 
being that Artillery should be under one head and direction, that the 
Divisional General has quite enough to do to dispose of his Infantry, 
without having also the Artillery to look after, and that for purposes 
of administration, matters would be very much simplified. 
The Army Artillery would be heavy guns of position, only brought 
up for special purposes, either of attack or defence, and being at 
other times left at the base or some intermediate place. 
I think most Artillerymen will cordially endorse a great deal which 
they will find in this book as regards their own arm. The author is 
