ORGAN, &C. 
651 
was to be against Austria, or, in short, what was the object to be 
attained ? The Tsar's laconic answer was “ Constantinople." The 
plan of operations reads curiously when looked at by the light of after 
history. The Danube was to be reached and crossed in a month, in 
three days the Balkans were to be reached, in five more Adrianople 
taken, and two weeks thereafter the Russian eagles were to float oyer 
the Bosphorus. And all this was to be done by four Army Corps, one 
of which was to remain in Roumania, one was to guard the communi¬ 
cations in Bulgaria and the Balkan Passes, and the remaining two were 
to deal the Turkish death blow ! Not till the last moment, and then 
only on the persistent prayers of the Grand Duke, were three more 
Army Corps of the Tsar's cherished troops thrown into the scale. 
Before such stupendous presumption, similar mistakes made in more 
recent military operations by two of the Great Powers of Europe pale. 
It must be confessed that the Russian precautions for keeping their 
point of crossing secret were perfect. Till the day previous, the Tsar 
even did not know where it was to be, and he was used as a decoy 
duck by the Grand Duke to draw the Turkish attention to Nicopolis, 
The wail of poor General Krudener, who commanded there, and 
believed he was to lead the way across the river, sounds almost melan¬ 
choly. “ Oh, why did you deceive me ? " he cried to the Tsar, when 
he marched into Simnitza. In several ways the presence of the Sovereign 
was hurtful to the army. In the first place his guard absorbed nearly 
an Army Corps. Again, he interfered in the councils of war, and very 
nearly succeeding in preventing Gourko's movement towards Orchanie, 
and his crossing the Balkans, one of the few operations which relieve 
the dull uniformity of blundering throughout the campaign. Much 
else there is in those interesting papers which the limits of a resume 
prevent our inserting, and the perusal of them (Part 5, Yol. XXI., of 
the “ Organ ,") would well repay anyone desirous of studying the 
history of the war behind the scenes. 
Captain Medycki's impressions on the lessons of the same war are 
most instructive to his hearers (the paper was read in the Militar- 
Wissentschaftlichen- Vereine , in Olmutz ) in plain, clear, and soldier-like 
language. His object is to point out the good and the bad points in 
the conduct of the campaign on both sides, and thence to draw his 
deductions. Prom the beginning, both sides committed grave strategical 
mistakes. The Russians began the war with totally insufficient forces, 
for which they were punished by Plevna, and the Turkish army was all 
split up, the three main bodies being wide apart, and quite independent 
of one another. They received their orders from the Council of War 
in Constantinople ; consequently all spirit of initiative was crushed out 
of their leaders, and, in the author's opinion, they neglected the one 
thing needful to hold the line of the Danube—a double bridge head at 
Rustchuk-Giurgevo, or Turtukai-Oltenitza. The wisdom of the choice 
by the Russians of the point for crossing the river cannot be denied, 
and the measures taken for deceiving the Turks (bombardment of 
Rustchuk and Nicopolis, concentration of boats opposite the latter, &c.), 
the barring of the river by torpedoes, the strict secrecy observed, and 
