230 
GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1880 . 
endeavour should be made to attain it, but we cannot admit that the 
above is the correct manner to secure it, for the following reasons, 
namely:—Forming up a comparatively large mass of artillery from 
column of route takes time and extends over considerable ground, 
hence, the main body of the infantry being to the rear, the mass can 
be but inadequately protected and therefore offers an opportunity* for 
striking a severe blow which an energetic defender is not likely to let 
slip ;f it is hazardous not to retain some artillery in hand to meet 
critical and unforeseen circumstances, and even though it may be 
possible to withdraw a part from action for a pressing new application, 
yet it may be a matter of some difficulty and must certainly be so of 
time more or less—which is usually an element of all importance— 
while the aid thus brought cannot be so effectual as that of fresher 
troops; it may, from the extent of its continuous line, delay unduly the 
deployment of the infantry and cause them to have greater distance to 
traverse, not only previous to deployment, but in their after advance, 
and also in the latter to mask quickly some of the guns; it facilitates, 
in the massing which it entails, the concentration of fire and consequent 
effect of the artillery of the defence; it will not, in general, permit of the 
guns taking advantage of the ground most suitable for them as posi¬ 
tions ; it is exposing the whole of the Gfeneral Commanding^ hand, 
tying him down to a certain line of action and using the arms of the 
service abnormally in applying them independently instead of in com¬ 
bination ; it is not necessary in order to prevent the enemy destroying 
in detail the artillery of the attack as it comes up, because the first 
position for the latter is so chosen as to be, as far as possible, beyond 
that range at which it is likely to suffer serious loss in this manner, 
while natural cover will probably be available and, if not, artificial may 
be thrown up, while, further, in the attack of an entrenched position, 
as already mentioned, guns should not be thrown forward till required 
to open fire and fire should be opened simultaneously and not inde¬ 
pendently ; nor is it necessary in order to concentration of fire, for this 
can usually be better obtained without concentration of guns, adapting 
the position of each battery, or division, to the particular object, or 
objects, of fire appointed it. 
We would therefore advocate the divisional artillery of the attack¬ 
ing divisions coming into action, to fulfil their role , locally with their 
divisions; then the corps artillery and the artillery of the division in 
reserve, supplementing them against the most decisive point, or points, 
—which become more evident as the engagement proceeds—and also 
acting as reserve proper. 
The corps artillery of a British army corps is laid down to consist of 
two 16-pr. field batteries and three 9-pr. horse artillery batteries, and 
the artillery of a division of two 16-pr. and one 9-pr. field battery. It 
is clear that of these the lighter and more mobile batteries are the more 
proper ones for discharging the chief duty of true reserve—namely, 
* This is the more apparent when we consider that with modern arms it takes hut a short time 
in the close fight to decide the question of success or reverse. 
f See on this subject R.A, Prize Essay, 1876, by Colonel Smyth, R,A, 
