250 
MARCH FROM MORAR TO KANDAHAR. 
at once/ - ’ but now so many bullocks bad died, or become disabled, 
3rd and 4th line of tbat it was found absolutely necessary to leave in tbe arsenal at 
in a Quetta! tmarsenal Quetta the 3rd and 4th line of wagons, the spare gun and mortar 
carriages, and one store cart. 
On the 30th the battery again marched towards the front, with 
1st and 2nd line of wagons, 2 store carts, and about 160 of the 
bullocks best able to march; 50 had to be left in Quetta unfit to 
proceed. Two fresh elephants had been obtained for the battery, 
from the commissariat, to replace those which had died. The 
commissariat establishment of the battery was again replenished, 
but no fodder for the cattle taken, as it was said this would be 
found on the road; (but, alas ! this proved not to be the case 
except in a few instances.) General Stewart and most of the 
troops were still in front, and the General had left express in¬ 
junctions for the battery to push on with all speed, to be ready in 
the event of Kandahar offering any resistance. The battery was 
escorted by the Head-Quarters and a wing of the 3rd Ghoorkas ; 
a company of sappers also formed part of the column. 
Ghaziaband Pass. On the second march from Quetta, the Ghaziaband Pass had to 
be crossed; this proved about 6 miles long, and towards the 
summit very steep. The water at each halting place on either 
side of the Pass was so brackish the animals would scarcely touch 
Water, “ brackisV’ it, and consequently suffered much from thirst for 56 hours. 
Between this and Gulistan Karez a large river was crossed; the 
banks being steep, ramps had been cut. The water was about 
2 ft. deep, so that, except in the case of a few quicksands, no 
difficulty was experienced in crossing. Since leaving Quetta no 
fodder for the elephants had been obtainable except a little lucern 
DeatVofanother grass, and not always that; the day after crossing the river 
elephant. another elephant died, and on reaching Gulistan Karez another 
was so fatigued that a dram of rum was given it, as this plan was 
found efficacious in cases of extreme exhaustion. 
Gulistan Karez. 
Scarcity of pro¬ 
visions. 
False “alarm.” 
On the 2nd of January, 1879, Gulistan Karez, at the foot of the 
Amram Range, was reached, where orders were awaiting for “two 
day's supplies of all kinds to be taken," as it would take two day's 
to cross the Pass, and it was notified that nothing whatever was 
to be got at the top. As there was no commissariat officer at 
Gulistan, the Officer commanding the battery again experienced 
great difficulties in getting in these supplies : all the villages for 
some distance round had to be requisitioned, and as sufficient 
could not at once be obtained, the battery was of necessity delayed 
one day. Whilst at Gulistan, the officers and men were warned 
not to undress, but to lie down with their arms and accoutrements, 
ready to turn out at a moment's notice, as a night attack was 
expected, but nothing occurred. 
On the 4th of January the battery again started forward, with 
Top of Kwaja Pass, orders to proceed via the Kwaja Pass; (most of the troops went 
by the Kojak). The camping-ground, about 2 miles short of the 
