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SUBALTERN OFFICERS. 
the mere acquisition of drill. It was impressed upon them that the 
moral and intellectual faculties of all soldiers must be developed side 
by side with their physical powers. They were to teach their men the 
value of self reliance, and self control, the necessity for exercising their 
judgment, for using their intelligence, for learning to think and act for 
themselves when the eye of their officer was no longer upon them. 
Above all they were to emancipate themselves from the cumbrous 
traditions of the military system of Frederick the Great.* It was upon 
this that Prince Frederick Charles insisted with all the vehemence of a 
true reformer. “ If Prussia,” he wrote, “ puts to herself this haughty 
question, What will be our fate in a war with France ? we can conquer, 
I shall answer; and we shall conquer her with a certain blow, if we 
know how to detach ourselves in time of war, from the routine of the 
drill ground, the demands of regulations, and from our system of 
skirmishers. Here is the difficulty; this is my only anxiety. The 
motive power which these forces give us is unsufficient to maintain 
discipline, to bring the soldiers up to the enemy, and to make them 
sustain their fire. Thank God we have others, and we shall know how 
to bring them to our aid.” 
5. The changes which were introduced in 1861 into the system of 
tactics were accompanied by corresponding changes in the administra¬ 
tion and interior economy of the Prussian Army. Then was established 
that admirable system of regimental organisation, which was so devised 
as to give full effect to the new ideas, and to develop to the utmost the 
fighting powers of every individual officer and soldier. The key note 
of the system is decentralisation to the smallest unit. In the German 
army every officer and soldier has his position, duties, and responsi¬ 
bilities definitely fixed and clearly understood. All have a certain 
charge entrusted to them, a certain responsibility to fulfil. There are 
no seconds-in-command, or other irresponsible officers ; everyone is the 
* In a paper contributed to the October number of the Edinburgh Review for 1870 
entitled, “ The Campaign of August,” which was generally attributed at- the time—and I 
believe rightly so—to the pen of Colonel Chesney, the Tactical Instructions were alluded to 
as follows:— 
“ From the time that this work was published, the system of rule and theory, by which 
officers were made drill-masters without being soldiers, which substituted parade ground 
practice for the imitation of real war, vanished from the Prussian service. All attempts 
to handle methodically a larger body of men than one brigade were dropped from the 
service ; and in their place came field manoeuvres, conducted so as to interest and teach 
each person employed, and to bring vividly before the minds of the higher officers the 
necessities of an actual campaign. The pedantry which had attempted to prescribe by 
minute rules for every contingency, and to take away from every individual all responsibility, 
save that of following the written law, was absolutely swept away, and in its place was put a 
set of sound, well-considered principles, the carrying out of which into practice was left 
in the main to the discretion and independent judgments of the officers concerned. This 
is the leading idea on which the ‘ Instructions ” are framed throughout. They aim at 
being no more than a general guide for the use of intelligent agents, for thoughtful and 
well-trained leaders. No one who catches the spirit of the “ Military Memorial ” will be 
surprised that its author has from the first been credited with inspiring the “ Instructions,” 
which have made that sp’rit the rale of the Prussian service, and have given each member 
of it that individuality which the Prince was the first to claim for him, and to each leader 
that moral lever wherewith men are raised in the face of danger to the greatest deeds of 
valour.” 
