384 
SUBALTERN OFFICERS. 
week to be called tlie “ subaltern's day/' when the divisions would be 
placed entirely at the disposal of their own officers ? All the subaltern 
officers would then have opportunities of taking out their divisions by 
themselves in drill or marching order, and exercising their two guns 
independently. Whenever possible, arrangements could be made by 
which officers would be allowed to manoeuvre their two guns in 
combination with small bodies of other troops. This plan of dividing 
up the battery into divisions, and detaching them under their own 
officers, would surely be of the utmost value in getting the junior 
officers and men to work together in the field : especially would it tend 
to give officers confidence in themselves, and teach them thus early in 
their military career how to handle artillery boldly, fearlessly, and yet 
prudently in action. Is not tactical knowledge and practice the great 
want of the present day, and would not the system here advocated tend 
towards improvement in this respect ? The annual practice might also 
with advantage be conducted according to this method. At present the 
practice is carried out under the immediate executive control of the bat¬ 
tery commander, who arranges all the details of the shooting, and draws 
up the practice report for the whole battery—the divisional officers only 
exercising a kind of general supervision. If each subaltern officer 
conducted the practice of his own division independently, and drew up 
his own practice report, submitting it to the battery commanding 
officer, would not this system be more likely to ensure careful practice, 
to promote a spirit of friendly emulation among marksmen, and induce 
officers to take greater interest in the shooting of their men than they 
now do ? Is it not the case as a general rule, that the lower decentral¬ 
isation is carried, the better work is done, because more are interested 
in the results ? 
10. In addition to holding subaltern officers responsible for the drill 
and instruction of the men of their divisions, it would seem 
advisable, in order to carry out thoroughly the system of decentralisation, 
to make them more completely answerable for the discipline of those 
under them than is now the case. At present they have no legal 
disciplinary powers whatever A When any of the men in their divisions 
misbehave themselves, the usual course adopted is for the sergeant- 
major of the battery to confine them as prisoners in the guard-room. 
* Military law, as at present enacted, only recognises the “ commanding officer ” as having 
the power to punish. As long as all authority and responsibility were centralised in this 
single indvidual, the “ commanding officer,” the limitation of the power of officers to 
punish is intelligible, and strictly logical. Inasmuch as the commanding officer was held 
solely responsible for the discipline of those under his command, it was clearly inexpedient 
for his subordinate regimental officers, holding a position of no responsibity, to exercise 
disciplinary powers as well as himself. When, however, authority becomes decentralised, 
and when every regimental officer has a certain definite charge to answer for, it follows 
that powers of punishment in proportion to his responsibility should be conferred upon him 
so as to enable him to. enforce the necessary discipline. The soundness of this argument 
is testified to by the fact that, when some years ago the call for decentralisation was first 
heard, the powers of punishment delegated to commanders of companies, troops, and 
batteries was extended, and they were allowed to award sentences of confinement to 
barracks for seven days, in place of three days, which had up to that time been the limit of 
their powers of sentence. 
