386 
StJBALTERN OFFICERS. 
many of those petty details of executive work, which at present occupy 
so much of his time, and prevent him giving his attention to higher 
and more responsible duties. It has been somewhere stated that the 
true functions of a commander are to combine the development of the 
individual initiative with complete subordination to control. While 
therefore the battery commander would delegate as much power and 
authority as possible to the divisional officers he would continue to 
exercise a constant supervision over their work.* Without interfering 
more than necessary he would see that the instruction was properly 
carried out according to his orders, he would point out errors, and 
would seek to secure uniformity, which could never be obtained if too 
great latitude were permitted to subordinates, and if they were allowed 
to get beyond the control of the guiding hand. On this question of 
regimental organization the author of the Wellington Prize Essay 
wrote as follows in 1871. “ If the habit be once acquired of being 
never intrusted with authority in even a limited degree, and of leaning 
always on the mere dictation of others, it becomes extremely difficult 
in later life for any man to shake himself free from it, and either 
willingly to assume responsibility, or—for the two things almost 
universally run together—to delegate power.” These are weighty 
words. They were written by an English Artillery officer soon after 
the fall of the French Empire at the battle of Sedan, where the baneful 
effects of centralisation had been so disastrously illustrated. 
12. If the system was established of battery officers carrying on the 
duties of training and instruction under the orders of the battery 
commander, there wonld be no necessity for the intervention of special 
instructors.! They would cease to exist from the sheer want of 
occupation. That this would be a step in the right direction, and that 
the work would be better done is surely beyond doubt. The special 
instructor, however well trained he may be, however zealous and 
energetic, has not the same direct interest in the men under instruction 
as their own officer would have if he were held responsible for their 
progress. The intervention of specialists is moreover an indirect 
reflection upon the capacity of the battery officers, and cannot fail to 
have a detrimental effect in regard to their relations with their men. 
* The integrity of the battery would iu no way be interfered with; its component parts 
would only be broken up into more complete units, capable of being re-united when 
necessary. ‘ A more elastic but a stronger bond must by these means, as well as by 
others, be substituted for that which we have—not because it is less essential than 
formerly that the whole army should be closely bound together, but because there is 
constant danger lest the bond should snap.” Wellington Prize Essay, page 55. 
f Special instructors of a certain class would still have their r61e, but that r61e would 
rather be to instruct regimental officers and non-commissioned officers than to perform 
any executive work themselves. The superintendent of the Riding Establishment is in 
this way a specialist, but a specialist in the right place. He is at the head of the regi¬ 
mental school of instruction in equitation to which officers and men are sent to be trained 
in order to fit them for the duty of training others. The brigade riding master however 
who interferes with the executive work of battery officers is an instance of a specialist in 
the wrong place. In the same way the commandant of the school of gunnery and his staff 
of instructors are specialists of the right class; while the brigade gunnery instructor, doing 
executive work, comes under the same category as the riding master and musketry, 
instructor. 
