GAEEISON AETILLEEY. 
391 
very weak in artillery; finally, no case is on record of the attacking 
force having at the outset so many guns at its command as to be able 
to hinder completely the prosecution of the work of arming on the part 
of the besieged. It must be remembered that in the war of 70-71 the 
artillery of the attack was greatly superior to that of the defence, that, 
moreover, excepting at Belfort, the guns were placed on the terrepleine 
and fired through deep embrasures—which important differences in the 
guns, and in their employment by the two contending parties, are 
hardly likely to occur again. Moreover, the arming of a stronghold 
can now be accomplished much more quickly than formerly. 
After further discussion of this point the authors state their opinion 
that the batteries of the first artillery position of the attack will in 
most cases be established unnoticed, but this is of no great importance, 
for their fire never has any effect on the end of the siege. 
As to the time of arming for the siege attack, the authors maintain 
that the opening of fire from the first artillery position would only 
cause the defenders to increase the number of guns at the part most 
exposed to fire, and that the complete arming should be coincident with 
the opening of fire from the second artillery position. They think that 
it would be always possible to carry on the arming under the fire from 
batteries of the second artillery position hurriedly thrown up in one night. 
The number of probable fronts of attack in a fortress of the present 
day is not great. Given a certain amount of activity among the 
defenders, and suppose the not unlikely case that they succeeded in 
discovering, with tolerable exactitude, the position in which the enemy 
was making his lodgements, they would be able to guess his intended 
points of attack with tolerable certainty. 
The preparations for arming all these fronts would now be begun as 
promptly as though the attack on them had actually commenced. 
It has been abundantly shown by experience, that beginning these 
preparations too early results in the greatest disorder and delay. 
If the platforms are in good order, and the guns and carriages in 
close proximity to the positions in which they will probably be required, 
the arming can be done in a very short time, and without any 
interruption. 
If the arming is carried on during the day under the fire of the 
besiegers, it must be done under cover of a hot fire from those guns 
which are already mounted; and those guns which have not been 
placed in their destined positions must be made as much use of as 
possible. The moral and physical effect of this was very obvious at 
Belfort, where even guns on fronts altogether remote from the enemy's 
attack were enabled, by being turned round, and by the employment of 
indirect fire, to take part in the artillery battle. 
If proper attention be paid by the defenders to established rules, 
they will, even if the first artillery position have been established 
without discovery, and fire be suddenly opened from it, be able to 
oppose it with sufficient strength, and to proceed uninterruptedly with 
their work. 
It may not be amiss to mention in this place a saying of Laurencie's 
who, as is well known, took a great part in the defence of Belfort. He 
