GARRISON ARTILLERY. 
393 
The electric light was employed for illuminating the ground in front 
both in the American civil war and in the campnign of 70-71. This 
method succeeded as often as it failed. If any object lay between the 
lighting apparatus and the position which it was desired to illumine, 
then this latter was so much in shadow as scarcely to be visible. This 
happened, for example, at the siege of Paris, when it was desired to 
illumine the works of the south attack. On the other hand the 
defenders succeeded by means of the electric light in discovering the 
works near St. Cloud, whence they dislodged the enemy. In Belfort 
there were several excellent opportunities for utilizing the electric 
light, but in that place the reflector of the apparatus received an injury, 
for the repair of which there were no means at hand. The defenders 
were therefore deprived of the use of it. It appears, therefore, that the 
usefulness of this method of illumination is hindered sometimes from 
external and sometimes internal causes. 
Light balls, &c., were, so far as we know, not used at all in the war 
of 70-71. They were used in the defence of Sebastopol, but no results 
worth mentioning were obtained by their use. They could generally 
only be used for short distances, in order to light up the object aimed at. 
The rocket light balls lately introduced in the German artillery hold 
out greater hopes of success in lighting a considerable extent of ground 
from above. Of their practical value little can be said with certainty, 
owing to the want of sufficient experiments with them. 
Lt.-General Fersmann and Lt.-Col. Schklarewitsch are of opinion 
that sorties for the purpose of discovering the enemy's works are 
altogether useless. Their success depends entirely on good luck, they 
cause an enormous strain on the troops of the defence, and expose 
them to the chance of terrible loss. 
The establishment of a line of outposts is in general of great value 
in the discovery of the enemy's works, yet the experience of war 
shows that this particular means of exploring the works of the 
attack does not hold out much hope of success, for the besieging 
force also pushes forward a line of outposts under cover of which his 
works are carried on. If the outposts of the defence wish to attain 
their object, a collision with the hostile outposts is inevitable. The 
skirmishing fire resulting from this may cause a false alarm and 
mislead the defenders, while the attacking force pursues its works 
unmolested, while the defenders receive conflicting intelligence as to 
the position of the enemy's works. 
Secret observation of the enemy was used with great effect by the 
defenders during the siege of Sebastopol. This was done in this wise. 
Small detachments were sent out on favourable nights to selected 
points, on the ground which had been thoroughly surveyed, whence 
the enemy's movements could be closely observed. With every detach¬ 
ment there was a gunner and sapper. The former observed the 
direction whence the enemy's shots proceeded, the latter endeavoured 
by different indications to discover the enemy's works. Notwith¬ 
standing the great advantages obtained by this mode at Sebastopol, 
it has not been subsequently much used. Further experiments are 
necessary to show whether or no this method is to be recommended 
