GERMAN MAN(EUVRES. 
27 
constant patrols were sent watch the road by Billigheim to Katzenthal. 
The outpost line of the East rested its right on the Elzthal and 
extended south through Auerbach to Unter-Shefflenz, the road to 
Katzenthal being watched by patrols. 
The two outpost lines were about miles apart. 
On the 16th the commander of the Western Division, whose object 
was to outflank and turn the enemy’s left and drive him north off his 
line of retreat on Adelsheim and Osterbiirken which he was covering, 
massed his right brigade behind the wood north-east of Sulzbach, and 
whilst he worked up to outflank the enemy’s right under cover of the 
woods and rolling ground, made a strong demonstration against the 
right, which was in position on the plateau about Auerbach and across 
the road south of it. The six batteries of his right column of the West 
Force came into action on the Hoh-Berg and the six batteries of the 
Corps Artillery soon prolonged the line of guns to the right and 
extended to the Hiihnerberg. The artillery of the East took up a 
position in front of Auerbach, and the artillery duel took place at 2000 
yards, the two Horse Artillery batteries being at some distance to the 
left front. The superior number of guns on the West side was soon 
adjudged to have crippled the Eastern Artillery, who had but eight 
batteries against twelve, and the infantry on the Hoh-Berg advanced 
and made a demonstration. The Eastern commander appeared to 
think that this was the main point of attack, and the great pre¬ 
ponderance of his force was on his right to meet it, when suddenly his 
opponent, who had concealed with great skill his troops, advanced 
against his enemy’s left, delivered his attack with his right brigade 
against the left, which was very weak. 
The Western Force had not only worked round his opponents left, 
but he had seized a wood which was immediately occupied in great 
force from the Eastern side of which the enemy’s line was enfiladed. 
The left of the Eastern Force was rolled up, while his right had been 
unable to make any head against the great battery of 72 guns on the 
Hoh-Berg and Hiihnerberg. There can be no doubt that he would 
have been effectually thrown off his line of communication and retreat, 
and that the detraining and assembly of troops at Adelsheim and 
Osterbiirken would have been completely uncovered. 
This closed the manoeuvres. 
Tactics .—The fundamental principles which I observed throughout 
were as follows :— 
In the attack (a) reconnoitring by the cavalry, which uncovered 
the front and moved in rear of a flank when the enemy was found ; fbj 
advance of the artillery to combat that of the defence; (c) formation 
of the infantry for attack under cover of the artillery fire; (d) a 
demonstration against one portion of the defender’s position, while the 
mass of the infantry is pushed under cover where possible against a 
flank ; ( e ) the attack, the firing line advances at one pace interval, the 
support follows at about 200 yards, also at one pace interval, the 
