ACTION COMMAND OF A SIEGE DIVISION. 
37 
70° being given, will be available for special work that other howitzers 
could not do so well; while batteries supplied with high explosive 
shell will often probably be more advantageously employed in some 
particular manner than in joining in the regular artillery duel. 
All these points and probably several others must be taken into 
consideration in allotting their targets to the batteries. 
(ii.) The indication to B.C.’s of the position of the target which indication of 
they have to engage and destroy is, perhaps, the most important and ^o/s. 0 
difficult of the Lieut.-Colonel's duties in action. On the means em¬ 
ployed to this end will depend in great measure the fire effect obtained 
by each battery and probably the consequent duration of siege 
operations. 
Hitherto this question has not received the attention that its im- importance 
portance demands; up till now our endeavour has been, and no doubt q ®e 3 tion 
rightly, to introduce and perfect a sound system of battery fire discip¬ 
line, this, I think, we may safely admit has now been obtained, as 
reference to the Practice Reports from Lydd for the last two years 
will show, and the time now seems to have arrived when we should 
turn our attention to the question of how the fire of any one or more 
batteries is to be turned, at will, on to any one of several objectives 
which it is desired to destroy. 
This demands some kind of target-indicator. No doubt several 
such instruments might readily bo devised, which would, more or less, 
answer the purpose, but before considering the actual form of such 
indicator, it will be as well to remember what the general disposition Disposition 
of batteries and observing stations of the attack will probably be. andobserT 
The principles involved are— ing 8tations - 
Target 
indicator. 
(a.) That the batteries must be placed in positions concealed 
from the enemy’s view. 
(b.) That the observing stations must be placed in commanding 
positions, from which as much as possible of the sur¬ 
rounding country (especially to the front) is visible. 
The O.C. the battery must be in the battery, only N.-C.O.’s or men 
will, as a rule, be in the observing stations. The B.C., therefore, is 
not in a position to determine the desirability of a change of target or 
to order it on his own initiative as he is dependent entirely on his 
observers and has no means of judging either the effect of his own fire 
or what points in the enemy’s line are most vulnerable or most necessary 
to attack. 
This must, therefore, necessarily become the province of the Lieut.- 
Colonel; it is he who must determine what portion of the enemy’s line 
each battery is to attack, who must point out to B.C.’s their targets 
and issue the necessary orders. 
To do this satisfactorily, his own position or fighting post must be it.-Coionei’s 
one from which he can get a good general view of the country and the Fi |ogt ng * 
enemy’s works and he must be provided with— 
(1.) A set of observing instruments and observers. 
