90 
ARTILLERY POSITIONS AND SCREENING GUNS. 
So it is evident that it is no new thing 1 am suggesting when I say 
that we should boldly advance our artillery over the crest and down 
the slope towards the enemy. Here at the battle of Worth we have it 
clearly demonstrated that by so doing we get :—■ 
Lessons. (a.) Room for a larger number of batteries and, therefore, greater 
concentration of fire. 
(b.) Power to see the enemy more distinctly; and this is 
everything when smokeless powder and, consequently, 
concealment of guns is the rule. 
(c.) Greater keenness to meet the enemy and more co-operation 
of the two arms—infantry support advance of guns— 
guns that of infantry—they interchange positions, and 
afford mutual support to drive back a counter-attack. 
(d.) More exposure to plunging fire and, therefore, less ricochet, 
because shell strikes ground more nearly at right angles. - 
Example V.—Example of use of screens :— 
rebdii^f in An a Hillery officer in the Canadian forces told me that on one 
Canada, occasion his battery was brought into action on the very edge of a 
plateau against Kiel’s men. Below was a nullah or rather valley, 
300 yards wide, full of brushwood, which reached up and covered the 
opposite bank. 
He was ordered to shell the rebels out of this wood. He had to go 
there; but their rifle fire knocked over his men every time they stood 
up to serve their guns. 
Finally, he had to collect some brushwood and other material for a 
screen in front of his guns to conceal his men’s movements. Then 
only was he able to fight his battery. 
Examfle YI.—Infantry sharp-shooters versus gun detachments in 
the open on the sky-line : — 
vi.— The following contention I do not give on my own authority, but 
Ir ?nfantry there is something in it. It is very hard on the R.A. 
& gun? a°t n Instead of one battery firing from “Holstock” on No. 1 range at 
Okehampton Okehampton, given a line of 60 guns in action on a similar crest 
firing over heather at the enemy’s guns, 3,500 yards off, on the 
northern slope of “ Yes Tor.” These 60 guns would take up a front 
of at least 1200 yards. Opposed to them is a force of infantry 
advancing up the West Okement river, whose numbers are neglected 
for the purposes of this argument, all except the firing line, occupied 
by one man to every yard. This gives 1,200 men in the firing line 
advancing over the ridge between “ Blackdown ” and “West Mill 
Tor” towards “Holstock.” This ridge is also assumed to be 1,200 
yards long. Now supposing that the infantry commander, instead of 
advancing his 1,200 men in a line, calls for volunteers, or elects to pick 
out his 120 best men, all crack shots, and starts them off down the hill 
towards the guns 1600 yards off at irregular intervals and distances. 
The ground is rough ; there are rocks and tussocks in every direction. 
There is nothing to prevent these men advancing almost unseen to 
