THE BRITISH ARMY ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE, 
171 
a force greater than Napoleon had at Austerlitz, double than that with wliioli he 
conquered Italy. In material sources also, the superiority of English mechanical 
skill was shown, and that intellectual power, which in science, arts and literature 
is nationally conspicuous, was not wanting to her Generals in war.” 
All this was, in addition to the immense navy, holding absolute command of 
every sea. 
GENERAL VIAL ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 1810. 
“From the campaign of 1810 we can acquire much information as to the best 
method of conducting defensive war. Wellington carefully prepared the theatre 
on which he wished to operate; he put his strong places in a good condition ; he 
organized lines of defence on which he could, if necessary, fall back; he secured 
his lines of communications ; he arranged for the- systematic devastation of the 
country in the line of the enemy’s advance; he created, at the far extremity of 
his theatre, a vast entrenched camp which enabled him to stand at bay, to face 
the enemy and to weary him out. Having thus prepared his ground, he concen¬ 
trated his forces; he only left advanced-guards at the frontier; he placed the 
mass of his forces three marches away so as to facilitate the first manoeuvres of 
his adversary. When the latter took the offensive, the English General used the 
strong places to exhaust and enfeeble his initiative. Then after the sieges, 
Wellington retired slowly, firmly and with method, neither allowing himself to 
be cut off, nor to be forced into fighting, and only fighting rear-guard actions 
on positions well chosen and so strong in themselves that success was almost 
assured in advance. Thus he led the enemy’s army far from its base of operations, 
through a ruined and deserted country, where it was harassed by a cloud of 
partisans always hanging about it. At last the camp of Torres Vedras was 
reached ; here he shut, himself up in an impregnable fortress. Soon famine, 
exhaustion, isolation and despair compelled the offensive army to undertake a 
difficult retreat and to evacuate Portugal.” 
EFFECT OF THE PENINSULAR WAR ON NAPOLEON’S DESTINIES. 
War with Russia by Napoleon began June 1812. In April the British and 
Portuguese army—for there was no Spanish regular army worth the name and 
the guerillas were as disastrous to friends as to foes—of 90,000 at most and per¬ 
chance, I exaggerate, occupied— 
291,379 men and 40,653 horses. 
In the Peninsula on March 1813 were 231,000 infantry, 29,000 cavalry. 
The battle of Lutzen in Germany took place in May. In 1814 Wellington 
detained 90,000 Frenchmen in the south of France. 
The French army which entered Russia consisted of— 
491,900 infantry. 
90,000 cavalry. 
164,000 horses. 
Of these 200,000 were Frenchmen. 
England assisted the European powers to cope with Napoleon in 1813 by no 
less a sum than £L2,000,000. 
In 1814 the same powers received nearly £4,000,000 ; in 1815, £7,000^000. 
