178 
COAST DEFENCE. 
improve our efficiency, for unless the dog is really there and is fierce, 
the notice board is of little value. Ideal Coast Defence consists 
undoubtedly in the possession of an all-powerful Navy, competent to 
watch, shepherd, and account for every ship in the enemy’s fleet—for 
every ship in any combination of foreign fleets that may possibly be 
pitted against ours. 
But, as the French Admiral Bourgois has pointed out, “ The weak 
can sometimes foil the watchfulness and precautions of the strong, and 
appear unexpectedly on an enemy’s coast, and there do much mischief. 
It is this consideration which makes Coast Defence a necessity.” 1 
Decent examples are forthcoming to teach the same lessons that 
Naval History invariably contains. The defeat of the Chinese by the 
Japanese points to the influence of sea-power on the destiny of nations. 
Again, the sequel to Admiral Mello’s useless destruction of life and 
property on the coasts of Brazil in 1893 and 1894 shows what must be 
the eventual fate of a navy, however strong, that does not rest upon 
safe bases. 
Admiral Mello, it will be remembered, had the greatest difficulty in 
obtaining supplies, carrying out refits, and giving his crews necessary 
rest during the protracted struggle. But one fort in Kio Harbour 
supported his cause, which was, as may be supposed, upon an island, 
and therefore, for purposes of supply and repair, little better than 
a large ship. 
Ashore Marshal Peixoto’s forts and garrison gunners served their 
purposes, although they appear to have been indifferently armed and 
provided with any ammunition that could be got hold of. 
Marshal Peixoto gained time to get together a fleet, and, although 
this fleet was an incongruous collection of vessels manned by scratch 
crews, its appearance off Bio, backed up by the forts, practically put 
an end to the civil war. 
This, then, is the true function of our coast fortresses—to hold the 
strategic bases of the Navy, if attacked, until naval relief is forth¬ 
coming; and, in the words of an experienced naval officer, Captain 
Martin Leake, written in 1728 , concerning the Portsmouth forts, 
“ Secure our Navy and a good harbour.” 2 And this duty will have to 
be carried out, not only for the Boyal Navy, but for the Mercantile 
Marine. To the Navy belongs the duty of keeping open the highways 
of the ocean to the vast trade of the Empire, valued in a recent 
Parliamentary return at over 954 millions a year. 3 To the Army, 
with the coast artillery as the pre-eminent arm, belongs the duty of 
securing the shore ends of the great trade routes. Sea-borne trade is 
the life-blood of the Empire, and its circulation must be maintained, 
or collapse and demise will result. The United Kingdom must be 
supplied with food from across the seas. Even if a sufficient store of 
food is kept up in England for any definite period, the people must be 
able to earn wages wherewith to purchase it; and to enable them to 
1 “ Lea Torpilleurs, la Guerre Navale et la Defense des Cotes,” p. 215. 
2 “Life of Captain Stephen Martin,” Navy Records Society, p. 213. 
8 Navy (Sea-going Warships, etc.), d. Admiralty, 3rd September, 1895. 
