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COAST DEFENCE. 
The true estimate of the relative value of ships and forts is strikingly 
and aptly illustrated by the action of the Earl of Sussex, who was 
Warden of Portsmouth at the time of the threatened invasion by 
Spain. To quote his own words in writing to Walsingham, July 26, 
1588: “ I have sent enclosed a letter from my Lord Admiral, which 
I received at six of the clock this morning, wherein he writeth for 
powder and shot, and saith he hath very great want thereof, by reason 
of three great tights which he hath had with the Spanish Fleet. 
Whereupon I have sent him so much as that I have altogether 
unfurnished myself, which I shall desire your Honour to be a means 
that it may be supplied, for that I shall have great want thereof if 
any attempt be offered.” 1 At six in the morning he heard the fleet 
was short of ammunition ; he immediately cleared out his magazines, 
and sent all his powder and shot away to the ships, leaving Portsmouth 
defenceless, and then wrote to London for fresh supplies, not only for 
himself, but as a further reserve for the fleet. He finished his letter 
by hoping that when writing again he might be able to send “ some 
certain news of good success,” thereby showing that possibility of 
invasion was still before the country when he stripped the defences of 
Portsmouth to supply the fleet. Again, if fortifications afford a sense 
of security to a nation (the Eoyal Commission of 1859-63 is a case 
in point), and if public opinion is prevented by the existence of forts 
from interfering with the direction of the movements of the fleet, then 
forts and gunners will indirectly prove of still further value to a 
maritime Empire such as ours. 
Possibly, had the coasts of England in Queen Elizabeth’s reign been 
comparatively as strongly fortified as they now are, Lord Howard of 
Effingham would not have been kept in the Channel against his will, 
and the Spanish Armada would probably never have seen the English 
coast. He wrote on June 14, 1588: “The opinion of Sir Francis 
Drake, Mr. Hawkyns, Mr. Frobisher, and others that be men of 
greatest judgment and experience, as also my own concurring with 
them in the same, is that the surest way to meet with the Spanish 
Fleet is upon their own coast, or in any harbour of their own, and 
there to defeat them.” Again he wrote: “ The seas are broad, but 
if we had been on their coasts they durst not have put off to us on 
their backs.” But he adds, “I must and will obey, and am glad there 
be such there as are able to iudge what is fitter for us to do than we 
here.” 1 
The same idea is contained in Captain Mahan’s “Influence of Sea 
Power on History.” “ There is a view of defence,” he says, “ which 
asserts that safety for one’s self—the real object of defensive prepara¬ 
tion—is best secured by attacking the enemy. England defended her 
own coasts and colonies by stationing her fleets off the French ports to 
fight the French Fleet if it came out.” Let us hope that existing forts 
may have this effect, and that public opinion will not again court 
disaster by localizing fleets. 
There appears to me to be another possible use for the G-arrison 
1 “Defeat of the Spanish Armada,” Navy Kecords Society. 
