182 
COAST DEFENCE. 
the functions of Garrison Artillery in war is something more than “de¬ 
terrent.” Having regard to the change in Continental Armies since 
the days of Waterloo, and to the conditions upon which rest the safety 
and existence of the Empire, I hold that our Army does not contain 
a service of greater importance than the coast artillery. 
Coast Forts should be manned by the Army, and not by the 
Navy. 
Now as to the manning of forts, there is a widespread and curious 
theory that admits the usefulness of coast forts, but considers that they 
should be evacuated by the Garrison Artillery, and handed over to the 
Navy and manned by sailors. If this were to happen, the actual work¬ 
ing of the forts would no doubt be well done, as sailors’ work invariably 
is, but this is not the only point to consider. When a naval base is 
attacked history shows us that, with few exceptions, the serious attack 
is directed on the land front. This attack may or may not be supported 
by a bombardment of the forts on the sea-front. A field force must be 
ready to render the assault abortive, either by direct conflict or by 
threatening the rear and communications of the attacking force; and if 
the attack is pressed home, the land fortifications should be able to hold 
out until relief is brought. Now, unless the advocates of sailors in coast 
forts are prepared to hand over, together with the coast forts, the land 
forts and field force of the fortress to the command of the Port Admiral, 
there will be a dividing line of authority inside the fortress, somewhere 
between its sea and land front. The fortress will be cut in half; 
surely neither one nor the other alternative is desirable. No, the 
function of the fleet is clear. Its locus operandi is on the sea. The 
function of the Army is equally as distinct, and its duties are ashore. 
Nature has provided a boundary fence between them; it is called the 
five-fathom line. Here and there, there may be—there must be— 
some overlapping to make the joint good. Where such is the case let 
the naval voice, by all means, in a naval nation be supreme. Captain 
Mahan, of the United States Navy, has once and for all laid down 
a definition difficult to disprove. He points out, in his “ Influence of 
Sea Power on History,” that there is “ much unnecessary wrangling as 
to the proper sphere of the Army and Navy in Coast Defence. Passive 
defences belong to the Army, everything that moves in the water to the 
Navy;” and in a previous paragraph he defines passive defences as 
“fortifications, submarine mines, and generally all permanent works 
destined simply to stop an enemy if he tries to enter a harbour.” 
“ If seamen,” he continues, “ are used to garrison forts, they become 
part of the land forces, as surely as troops, when embarked as part of 
the complement, become part of the sea forces.” 
There is an expression in common use with regard to the sea and 
land forces of which we have recently heard frequent mention. I 
allude to what is called the first and second line of defence. It has 
always appeared to me that this term is not only inaccurate but 
misleading, and therefore wholly undesirable. If my judgment is 
