324 
GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1897 . 
The nearer a port to the enemy's bases the more liable it obviously 
is to this form of attack. But no ports, however distant, can be con¬ 
sidered free from it, for if out of range of sea-going boats they are still 
open to attack from smaller types carried by battle-ships and cruisers. 
Indeed the very fact of their situation at a distance from home may 
be a source of danger. Submarine cables may be cut at sea before 
war is declared, and, without intelligence of current events, the first 
intimation of hostilities may be derived from an experience of this 
nature. 
It has been stated above that Raid is to be expected in any condition 
of sea power. This is obviously the case when command of the sea is 
indifferent, or doubtful, or in the hands of the enemy; and until the 
advent of the torpedo-boat destroyer no argument was required as to 
the possibility of its use even by an enemy blockaded in his own ports, 
since the immense difficulty of making blockade so effective as to hem 
in torpedo boats with certainty was universally acknowledged. But 
as one of the chief functions of the destroyer is to assist in blockade 
with especial reference to torpedo boats, it may be well to enquire how 
far the question has been modified by their adoption during the last 
three years. Some help is to be obtained from a study of the manoeu¬ 
vres of the torpedo squadron under Rear-Admiral Wilson, v.c., in 
1895, one of the objects of which was to test the capabilities of 
destroyers in this respect. The manoeuvres were confidential, and no 
definite conclusions appear to have been published. Accounts are 
somewhat contradictory in detail but it is recorded that in an instance 
where ten torpedo boats with two gun boats were blockaded in two 
ports, Wicklow and Howth, by twelve destroyers and two cruisers :— 
“ The boats at Howth experienced no great difficulty, owing to the 
darkness, in evading the blockaders, and joining the Curlew at a pre¬ 
arranged rendezvous they effected an entrance into Wicklow." * 
Here they remained safe for about thirty-six hours. On the follow¬ 
ing night :— 
“ Being again dark and the weather fine the boats endeavoured to 
leave their ports. Five of them were put out of action in the attempt, 
and others were also claimed by the destroyers on less conclusive 
evidence. No. 94 escaped by a ruse, disguising herself as a destroyer 
by fitting up an additional funnel." * 
“ The net result seems to have been that in spite of the blockading 
squadrons of torpedo-boat catchers (sic), the bulk of the torpedo boats 
appear to have found no difficulty in eluding them, and breaking out 
of the blockaded harbours." t 
So far as can be traced no manoeuvres have taken place since 1895 
the published accounts of which throw any further light on this ques¬ 
tion. The following remarks however bear on the subject. 
“ The object in view, that originally led to the construction of these 
destroyers, was the annihilation of the smaller patterns of torpedo boats, 
but it is impossible to doubt that in addition to such work a portion of 
them must be used as torpedo boats." J 
* “ British Naval Manoeuvres,” Charles Greig, late R.N., Brassey’s Naval Annual, 1896. 
f “ Naval and Military Notes,” Journal of the R.U.S. Institution, Yol. xxxix. No. 211. 
X “The Value of Torpedo Boats in War Time.” 
