342 
COMMENDED ESSAY, 1897 . 
Coast Artillery. Many pages have been written on the “ tactics ” of 
Coast Defence, and the various forms of attack by ships have been 
discussed over and over again, but in spite of it all we are content to go 
on hitting, or trying to hit, targets towed backwards and forwards in 
front of our guns, and to draw the conclusion that it would be folly for 
ships to come within range. 
Practice, Avith a view to the requirements of actual warfare, should 
include much more than hitting targets, and its object should be the 
attainment of readiness and rapidity as well as accuracy. 
It has now been laid down by authority that a raid is the most 
probable form of attack with which our Coast Artillery may have to 
deal. A raid may be made either at the first outset of war—it may even 
be the first act of Avar before hostilities are declared—or it may be made 
after a Avar has been going on for some time. In either case, to have a 
chance of success, it ought to be sudden and if possible unexpected ; 
and here is one of the chief points wherein our targets differ from 
hostile ships. No one could possibly regard the movements of a 
“ Record,” or any other target, as either sudden or unexpected. Even 
if no one knoAvs the exact moment at which practice is to begin, at any 
rate the master-gunner knows beforehand that practice Avill take place 
from his fort on a certain day, and can arrange to have the necessary 
stores laid out for the occasion ; and yet it is on the preparedness of 
the guns and ammunition quite as much as on the accuracy of shooting 
that success depends. Fortunately a raid is not likely to be made by a 
large fleet, and there is no necessity therefore for keeping all the guns 
of a fortress in a constant state of readiness to open fire ; but certain 
guns ought always to be ready, and by this is meant that the process 
knoAvn as “ preparing for action ” should not be necessary ; stores 
should be Avith the guns ; range-finding instruments should be set up 
and adjusted, and tAvo or three rounds of ammunition should be 
immediately available. A sufficient number of men must also live on 
the spot to man the guns in case of need. Of course if it'vvere our 
custom to prepare for action whenever our relations Avith a foreign 
poAver Avere strained there Avould be no need for these precautions, but 
Ave cannot count upon this being done ; it is more likely that prepara¬ 
tions would be postponed till they were too late, from fear lest they 
should themselves precipitate the war. Certain guns must therefore 
ahvays be ready. After war has broken out and our ships have got a 
grip of the enemy, there will be time to complete the manning of the 
other guns ; but in the hours immediately preceding and immediately 
after a declaration of war our Coast forts must share with our Navy to 
a certain extent the honour of forming our front line, and must be in a 
sufficient state of readiness to repel a raid. 
If there is any reason for the existence of a fort there Avill be some 
advantage to the enemy in destroying it, and, apart from an attack by 
torpedo boats, perhaps the most probable object of a raid would be the 
destruction of one or more forts. It is clear that if a fort is unprepared 
a ship can go in to close quarters and render it useless in half-an-hour, 
and it is our business therefore to be in a position to bring such a fire 
to bear at a moment’s notice as will keep a ship at long range or sink it 
if it comes to close range. There are of course many forts which from 
their position would be comparatively safe, and would not need pro¬ 
tection against this form of attack, but these very forts would probably 
be the best to utilize for the protection of the exposed forts, and it 
