354 
COMMENDED ESSAY, 1897 . 
Conclusion. 
stress on the importance of obtaining decisive effects with very few 
rounds. Theoretically, a company will have attained perfection as 
nearly as possible by the. end of its annual course, and it must then 
abide by the result of its competitive rounds. If it fails in this it might 
equally fail when its opportunity comes in war. Such an opportunity 
will not be extended over several weeks, neither should competition, 
as has been suggested, be extended over the whole service practice of 
the company. There should be no talk of flukes and bad luck ; these 
must be eliminated by the previous training, or we shall not be able to 
count upon hitting our enemy’s ships in war. But competitive practice 
has also a grave disadvantage ; it leads companies to expend their 
energies in learning to work with one particular class of gun in one 
particular fort, and to neglect to that extent their proper war training. 
This is a very serious matter when the annual course affords the only 
chance a company gets of learning to fight. The hundred and odd 
pounds expended by each company in the competitive practice and in 
the preliminary practice with the same guns, which is generally 
allowed just before the competitive, would be much more usefully 
expended, if the requirements of actual warfare are taken into con¬ 
sideration, in providing additional ammunition to be fired from the 
guns which the company mans in war. 
The suggestion that 6" B.L. guns should be used instead of 9" or 10" 
R.M.L. for competitive practice, is not considered a good one because 
for a long time to come, at any rate at home, companies are more likely 
to have to fight R.M.L. guns than B.L. 
This disadvantage attached to competitive practice outweighs the 
advantages derived from it ; but if annual practice in the future were 
carried out as recommended in this essay, it is possible that some of the 
preliminary practice with 64 pr. guns might be made competitive with¬ 
out doing serious harm. 
To sum up, the principal proposals which have been made are as 
follows :— 
(1.) To keep certain guns in a constant state of readiness so that, in 
case of sudden attack, a hostile squadron would run great risk in trying 
to attack a fort at close quarters. 
(2.) To ask the Navy to help us in obtaining that practice in keeping 
ourselves ready for war which is essential to success, but cannot be 
obtained without their co-operation. 
(3.) To concentrate the work of companies, as regards charge of 
armament, daily drill and annual practice, as much as possible upon 
the forts which they would man in war ; since this is the only way in 
which practical knowledge of how best to fight the forts can be ob¬ 
tained, and that proficiency in drill secured which will alone give us a 
proper standard of rapidity and accuracy. 
(4.) To improve the means for hoisting projectiles, and so save much 
time in loading. 
(5.) To make certain alterations in drill, in order to secure better fire 
control and greater simplicity and safety. 
(6.) To work out a sound system of fighting Q.F. guns, instead of 
allowing layers to work them independently. 
(7.) To keep the I.O.M. and I.R.F. and others to their proper work. 
