358 
COMMENDED ESSAY, 1897. 
Most probable 
form of attack. 
Necessity for 
simplification of 
details. 
Casualties. 
In time of war, it is probable that torpedo boats will be attached to 
every defended port, and may be sent out to sea to watch for the 
enemy’s approach, and to give timely warning to ships in harbour and to 
the defences. It would then be of great benefit to all concerned, if 
torpedo boats could be more often practised in communication with 
Coast Artillery, and lent by the Navy to act as quick moving targets, 
for practice with blank from Q.F. and other guns, by day and night. 
The form of attack we are most likely to meet with at coaling stations 
and protected dockyards, will be sudden raids by torpedo boats or fast 
cruisers, for the purposes of destroying shipping and coal supplies, and 
it is of vital importance that these should be defeated. 
It seems to be generally agreed by authorities in such matters, that 
no enemy would risk the loss of his ammunition in a general bombard¬ 
ment, if there was any possibility of a subsequent engagement with our 
ships ; but sudden attacks are more than probable, even if we have 
command of the sea, as fast fleets may easily elude their superiors, as 
illustrated only last year in the French Manoeuvres, and Admiral 
Seymour’s getting into Lough Swilly. By running through the defences, 
or covering an attack by torpedo boats, they could in a very short time 
do incalculable damage. It is then against this form of attack that we 
must be best prepared, and our practice should aim at getting all 
concerned into the way of acting quickly and with decision, and the 
importance of carrying on a rapid fire should be emphasized. Quicker 
moving targets should be supplied and the ranges made to alter more 
rapidly ; turning on the fire of guns, from one target to another, without 
delay, should be more often practised, and the object should be to get 
as many rounds near the target, in as short a time, as possible, consistent 
with fair accuracy, and not sacrifice everything to the mere object of 
hitting a far smaller objective, than any we would meet with in action. 
In stations liable to such, torpedo boat raids and running past attacks 
should be constantly rehearsed, the Navy being asked to assist by lend¬ 
ing one or two torpedo boats, as before suggested, and at every station 
all possible forms of attack should be thought out and represented, both 
at drill and practice. 
In war time a great part of our home coast defences would be manned 
by Militia and Volunteers, and although the gun detachments could 
very soon be got into good drill, the officers, some of whom would have 
responsible commands, often do not get sufficient opportunities in peace 
practice to become thoroughly at home in all the details of the various 
methods of ranging, etc. ; there would also be reserve men coming in, 
and detachments of regulars sent out to certain coaling stations, 
differently armed perhaps to the station they have been serving in. 
For these reasons, everything should be made so simple and clear that a 
very little drill would get everyone into good working order, and the 
first step necessary to do this would be to assimilate as far as possible 
the systems of ranging and fighting guns, whether by P.F. or D.R.F., 
so that the one drill may do for both, and a battery command pass 
without hitch from one to the other. 
When in action, everything must be so arranged that casualties may 
be replaced rapidly and without confusion ; the next senior must 
always be prepared to move up one step and take command ; all officers 
should understand the various systems of ranging, and what is to be 
done in the case of any instrument getting out of order ; in every 
detachment there should be men capable of replacing the gun captain 
